An argument for panpsychism.

[Dr. Zaus]

So it seems to be a special kind of arbitrary to define certain outward behavior patterns as "unconscious" when foremost we have no idea about any consciousness besides our own, and equally, it is literally impossible to know even first-hand or "zero-th hand" what it means to be unconscious, or even if such a state is possible in the first place.

I would even extend this to the facial nature of 'sub continuous' experience.

Experimentally I've shown this in a psych lab. Subliminal primes intended to change the implicit associations between things works; but only in such a way as is entirely eradicated by placebo treatments to eliminate affectivity.

For example: it can be said that moral judgments are made sub-continuously and then justified logically, but when we offer a picture that does nothing but we tell the subject "this picture makes you feel disgusted" it eliminates how immoral we judge someone's actions to be: because we've got some other excuse for our affective state.

 

[dank69]

I would even extend this to the facial nature of 'sub continuous' experience.

Experimentally I've shown this in a psych lab. Subliminal primes intended to change the implicit associations between things works; but only in such a way as is entirely eradicated by placebo treatments to eliminate affectivity.

For example: it can be said that moral judgments are made sub-continuously and then justified logically, but when we offer a picture that does nothing but we tell the subject "this picture makes you feel disgusted" it eliminates how immoral we judge someone's actions to be: because we've got some other excuse for our affective state.

Can you elaborate on this experiment a bit?

 

[Dr. Zaus]

Can you elaborate on this experiment a bit?

I'll get detailed:

There are, according to Kant, Perfect duties and Imperfect duties. This is supposed to be a 'logical' deduction about what is right and wrong that occurs subconsciously.

When we setup a scenario where Jim violates an imperfect duty then ask about the morality of Jim we get very little response saying that Jim is particularly immoral.

When we setup a scenario where Jim violates a perfect duty then ask about the morality of Jim we get very a large response saying that Jim is particularly immoral.

All this makes sense given that Kant is right; but it also makes sense given that judgments are little more than how 'disgusted we feel' about someone. So how do we parse the difference?

We set up an experiment with two treatments after prompting them with the story of john violating a perfect or an imperfect duty (1) Show the subject a picture, say that the picture causes people to feel disgust and it has been validated in UCLA, Stanford, Berkeley, and now we're seeing if the findings replicate here. (2) Show the subject a picture, say that it does nothing.

For the second group (picture is said to do nothing) the findings look like this:
When we setup a scenario where Jim violates an imperfect duty then ask about the morality of Jim we get very little response saying that Jim is particularly immoral.

When we setup a scenario where Jim violates a perfect duty then ask about the morality of Jim we get very a large response saying that Jim is particularly immoral.

For the first group (picture is said to make you feel disgusted) the findings look like this:
When we setup a scenario where Jim violates an imperfect duty then ask about the morality of Jim we get very little response saying that Jim is particularly immoral.

When we setup a scenario where Jim violates a perfect duty then ask about the morality of Jim we get very a very little response saying that Jim is particularly immoral.


Conclusion:
The Kantian perfect v. imperfect duties are not a function of either logical processing or subconscious processing; they are a matter of affectivity (how you feel towards something). If someone violates a perfect duty but I give you something that can explain-away your negative feeling about the violation of that imperfect duty you no longer rate that person as immoral for having violated that imperfect duty.

There are limits; if Jim kills a bunch of Jewish babies the picture is unlikely to overcome, but if we can some how make you feel like you were disgusted for other reasons then it will reduce how bad you think Jim is.


It's a cute experiment; but it shows us that the subconscious as a theoretical kind of mind outside regular consciousness (at least in the Kantian sense) is nonsense: or at very least predictions that seem to necessarily flow from it do not hold up (which is my definition of disproof of a theory).

The countervailing argument regarding Kant's derivations taken out of Descartes subject-object split is an argument for unity in experience: a phenomenological perspective that relies on exactly what CT was talking about, a focus on the phenomenon in question (in philosophy the meaning of what it is to be).


Hopefully I've gotten better at explaining this stuff in some readable manner.

 

[Onceler]

Sounds Hermetic to me.

 

[dank69]

I'll get detailed:

There are, according to Kant, Perfect duties and Imperfect duties. This is supposed to be a 'logical' deduction about what is right and wrong that occurs subconsciously.

When we setup a scenario where Jim violates an imperfect duty then ask about the morality of Jim we get very little response saying that Jim is particularly immoral.

When we setup a scenario where Jim violates a perfect duty then ask about the morality of Jim we get very a large response saying that Jim is particularly immoral.

All this makes sense given that Kant is right; but it also makes sense given that judgments are little more than how 'disgusted we feel' about someone. So how do we parse the difference?

We set up an experiment with two treatments after prompting them with the story of john violating a perfect or an imperfect duty (1) Show the subject a picture, say that the picture causes people to feel disgust and it has been validated in UCLA, Stanford, Berkeley, and now we're seeing if the findings replicate here. (2) Show the subject a picture, say that it does nothing.

For the second group (picture is said to do nothing) the findings look like this:
When we setup a scenario where Jim violates an imperfect duty then ask about the morality of Jim we get very little response saying that Jim is particularly immoral.

When we setup a scenario where Jim violates a perfect duty then ask about the morality of Jim we get very a large response saying that Jim is particularly immoral.

For the first group (picture is said to make you feel disgusted) the findings look like this:
When we setup a scenario where Jim violates an imperfect duty then ask about the morality of Jim we get very little response saying that Jim is particularly immoral.

When we setup a scenario where Jim violates a perfect duty then ask about the morality of Jim we get very a very little response saying that Jim is particularly immoral.


Conclusion:
The Kantian perfect v. imperfect duties are not a function of either logical processing or subconscious processing; they are a matter of affectivity (how you feel towards something). If someone violates a perfect duty but I give you something that can explain-away your negative feeling about the violation of that imperfect duty you no longer rate that person as immoral for having violated that imperfect duty.

There are limits; if Jim kills a bunch of Jewish babies the picture is unlikely to overcome, but if we can some how make you feel like you were disgusted for other reasons then it will reduce how bad you think Jim is.


It's a cute experiment; but it shows us that the subconscious as a theoretical kind of mind outside regular consciousness (at least in the Kantian sense) is nonsense: or at very least predictions that seem to necessarily flow from it do not hold up (which is my definition of disproof of a theory).

The countervailing argument regarding Kant's derivations taken out of Descartes subject-object split is an argument for unity in experience: a phenomenological perspective that relies on exactly what CT was talking about, a focus on the phenomenon in question (in philosophy the meaning of what it is to be).


Hopefully I've gotten better at explaining this stuff in some readable manner.

Fascinating! Thanks for sharing, and yes, very well explained. I do have one follow up question. Did you tell them the story, then show them the picture and then ask what they thought about Jim? Or did you show them the picture while telling the story about Jim? I'm curious about the timing.

 

[Dr. Zaus]

Did you tell them the story, then show them the picture and then ask what they thought about Jim?

In my replication of it, the picture was both given before the story and after; both with non-trivial effects.

 

[dank69]

In my replication of it, the picture was both given before the story and after; both with non-trivial effects.

I find that surprising. I would have thought that their feelings for Jim would have already been developed and processed by the time you show them the picture but that doesn't seem to be the case. :hmm:

 

[Dr. Zaus]

I find that surprising. I would have thought that their feelings for Jim would have already been developed and processed by the time you show them the picture but that doesn't seem to be the case. :hmm:

I'll submit to run the replication study again, this time so I can detect effect-size differences between the two.

It also works with videos that actually induce emotional change; thus leading to mis-attribution.