For deadly force to be constitutional when an arrest is taking place, it must be the reasonable choice under all the circumstances at the time. Therefore, deadly force should be looked at as an option that is used when it is believed that no other action will succeed. The
Model Penal Code, although not adopted in all states, restricts police action regarding deadly force. According to the code, officers should not use deadly force unless the action will not endanger innocent bystanders, the suspect used deadly force in committing the crime, or the officers believe a delay in arrest may result in injury or death to other people.
Circumstances that are taken into consideration are the severity of the offense, how much of a threat the suspect poses, and the suspect's attempts to resist or flee the police officer. When arresting someone for a misdemeanor, the police have the right to shoot the alleged offender only in self-defense. If an officer shoots a suspect accused of a misdemeanor for a reason other than self-defense, the officer can be held liable for criminal charges and damages for injuries to the suspect. This standard was demonstrated in the Iowa case of
Klinkel v. Saddler, 211 Iowa 368, 233 N.W. 538 (1930), where a sheriff faced a
Wrongful Death lawsuit because he had killed a misdemeanor suspect during an arrest. The sheriff said he had used deadly force to defend himself, and the court ruled in his favor.
When police officers are arresting someone for a felony, the courts have given them a little more leeway. The police may use all the force that is necessary to overcome resistance, even if that means killing the person they are trying to arrest. However, if it is proved that an officer used more force than was necessary, the officer can be held criminally and civilly liable. In
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985), the Supreme Court ruled that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police officers to use deadly force to stop fleeing felony suspects who are nonviolent and unarmed. The decision, with an opinion written by Justice byron r. white, said, in part, "We conclude that such force may not be used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others."