The argument between Gen. [Eric] Shinseki, Secretary [of the Army Thomas] White, and Donald Rumsfeld -- what was the debate about?
Supposedly Mr. Rumsfeld was unhappy the Army was not transforming fast enough, going the way he wanted. I find that unbelievable. If you look at what the chief of staff of the Army, Gen. Shinseki, was trying to do, he had laid out a clear vision that he was trying to move to.
He had started a program with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA, to develop a future combat system, replace current tracked and wheeled vehicles -- a very imaginary, far-reaching program. There was a lot of argument about the solutions they were proposing, but you can't say it was not transformational. It was very transformational. ... And he's accused of not being willing to change the Army. The man was willing to change the Army. He gets a bum rap.
I don't know what the difficulty was. My belief is Mr. Rumsfeld came in believing he could pay for high-tech weapons, particularly some of the things in terms of missile defense, space-based systems, by cutting two more divisions out of the Army. So his idea of transformation, I think, was pare the Army down in terms of the force structure, use the money for high tech. Professionally unschooled.
And then Shinseki, with 15 months to go in his term, gets the word that his replacement's been announced. How does that go down inside the uniformed services?
I know of nothing other than the failure to plan adequately for the war in Iraq that upset the retired community nearly as much as Mr. Rumsfeld's treatment of the chief of staff of the Army, Gen. Shinseki.
Just irate. I've been in meetings and breakfasts and lunch where this is a subject of conversation and just a very, very bitter feeling that he would treat someone like that.
And then when the general retires, a service chief retiring, and not to attend that retirement ceremony that would have any other high-ranking officials from his office, is just a slap in the face. Why would you do that?
What you find now is, when the Defense Department leadership is having difficulties because of the problems in Iraq and around the world, is those who would normally step forward for their defense and offer some explanation don't have any explanations.
We think it's pure failure. In some cases, it's culpable negligence.
When the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff goes in front of Congress and testifies, "We did not develop a plan for what took place after the so-called major combat operations because we feared it might be a reason to cause the war," you slap yourself in the head and you say it was an open secret. We were planning to go to war in Iraq. How would planning for the aftermath cause the war?