Humans are essentially machines with programming

[enwar3]

Doesn't it seem as if the only thing separating any machine from humanity is the correct programming? Or that without our supposed rationality, our body would be but a machine?

 

[videogames101]

our body is a machine, free will is an illusion, everything is pre-determined.


(prove me wrong)


you can't.



(prove me right)




you can't



in fact, this thread cannot be answered, it fails

1/10



(yep, i'm in my harsh truth mode atm)

 

[upsciLLion]

Originally posted by: videogames101
our body is a machine, free will is an illusion, everything is pre-determined.


(prove me wrong)


you can't.



(prove me right)




you can't



in fact, this thread cannot be answered, it fails

1/10



(yep, i'm in my harsh truth mode atm)

Go lick a butt.

 

[SlitheryDee]

Nah. Besides if our body without rationality is a machine then the inclusion of rationality would only make it a more complicated machine, not something else entirely.

 

[videogames101]

Originally posted by: upsciLLion

Originally posted by: videogames101
our body is a machine, free will is an illusion, everything is pre-determined.


(prove me wrong)


you can't.



(prove me right)




you can't



in fact, this thread cannot be answered, it fails

1/10



(yep, i'm in my harsh truth mode atm)

Go lick a butt.

ty for that

 

[George P Burdell]

It's a good thing I wasn't around in the early days of the product development cycle. Debugging must've been a bitch.

 

[Fritzo]

Actually, our bodies are the result of 100's of 1000's of complex chemical reactions would be more accurate.

 

[Cerpin Taxt]

There are formidable arguments to the effect that human reasoning cannot be represented by some underlying formal system.

See: Yesterday's algorithm: Penrose and the Godel argument (PDF)

 

[upsciLLion]

Originally posted by: videogames101

Originally posted by: upsciLLion

Originally posted by: videogames101
our body is a machine, free will is an illusion, everything is pre-determined.


(prove me wrong)


you can't.



(prove me right)




you can't



in fact, this thread cannot be answered, it fails

1/10



(yep, i'm in my harsh truth mode atm)

Go lick a butt.

ty for that

No, thank you. I feel much cleaner.

 

[Jeff7]

Agreed. We simply use neurons and chemicals instead of transistors and electrons.

 

[bignateyk]

Originally posted by: Fritzo
Actually, our bodies are the result of 100's of 1000's of complex chemical reactions would be more accurate.

That's what she said.

 

[Capt Caveman]

0/10

 

[mrkun]

Define machine.

 

[RapidSnail]

Originally posted by: Jeff7
Agreed. We simply use neurons and chemicals instead of transistors and electrons.

That made me laugh for some reason.

 

[her209]

Originally posted by: mrkun
Define machine.

Input -> Machine -> Output

 

[WHAMPOM]

Originally posted by: enwar3
Doesn't it seem as if the only thing separating any machine from humanity is the correct programming? Or that without our supposed rationality, our body would be but a machine?

Nine tenths hard wired and one tenth self programming at the start, but with many redundancies and compensation adaptions.

 

[Flyback]

At first glance your thread will likely get laughed at and people will shrug you off, but I simply do not know how anyone can adopt a naturalist perspective and not agree that humans are just machines ("chemical scum"). You cannot cherry pick if you are a naturalist and yet I manage to see people repeatedly attempt to inject their own belief system into what they call "naturalism". Things they throw around but do not fit within the tenets of their professed belief:

Free will (define it -- soft determinism doesn't count)
Mental causation (is it not inert if the physiological is all that matters?)
Consciousness (as something non-illusory, a byproduct)
Qualia (measure this in scientific terms or else it doesn't exist)
Responsibility for actions (in a cause and effect deterministic system, I don't know how you could *ever* say this exists or at least the individual has any "personal" responsibility)

I am a dualist and I respect the naturalist's right to an opinion, but I question whether they fully appreciate the view they advocate or whether it is adopted for some other reason(s).

 

[RESmonkey]

It's a complex organic machine made of molecules that interact with each other on a level that isn't fully understood yet (at least, the brain portion).

/thread

 

[Colt45]

Machines don't usually put up with BS for 35 years, and then go postal. Gotta program that in.

 

[NanoStuff]

Originally posted by: Jeff7
Agreed. We simply use neurons and chemicals instead of transistors and electrons.

No we don't. We use transistors and electrons. The chemicals just make communication to large groups of cells more efficient, ultimately electrical nevertheless.

 

[Shawn]

Originally posted by: Colt45
Machines don't usually put up with BS for 35 years, and then go postal. Gotta program that in.

i just realized you have ethanol (drinking alcohol) in your sig. nice!

 

[mrkun]

Originally posted by: her209

Originally posted by: mrkun
Define machine.

Input -> Machine -> Output

Can you be more specific?

 

[Aikouka]

Yes, I believe with a database and a state machine, you could represent a human's method of thinking... including going postal after 35 years.

 

[mrkun]

Originally posted by: Flyback
At first glance your thread will likely get laughed at and people will shrug you off, but I simply do not know how anyone can adopt a naturalist perspective and not agree that humans are just machines ("chemical scum"). You cannot cherry pick if you are a naturalist and yet I manage to see people repeatedly attempt to inject their own belief system into what they call "naturalism". Things they throw around but do not fit within the tenets of their professed belief:

Free will (define it -- soft determinism doesn't count)
Mental causation (is it not inert if the physiological is all that matters?)
Consciousness (as something non-illusory, a byproduct)
Qualia (measure this in scientific terms or else it doesn't exist)
Responsibility for actions (in a cause and effect deterministic system, I don't know how you could *ever* say this exists or at least the individual has any "personal" responsibility)

I am a dualist and I respect the naturalist's right to an opinion, but I question whether they fully appreciate the view they advocate or whether it is adopted for some other reason(s).

Causality and the existence of consciousness are two separate issues. You can have consciousness (as defined by the existence of qualia) in a fully determinate universe. Science doesn't necessarily preclude qualia either: It's not possible to give a physical account of economic laws even though they we can empirically verify they exist. To deny qualia is to deny the value of empirical experience, which in fact seems contrary to the premise of science.

I don't see how mental causation is an issue for materialism either. Why must mental states be something other than physical in origin?

Are you aware of David Chalmer's theory of "non-reductive materialism" with regard to consciousness? I would suggest reading his book The Conscious Mind.

 

[Flyback]

Originally posted by: mrkun

Originally posted by: Flyback
At first glance your thread will likely get laughed at and people will shrug you off, but I simply do not know how anyone can adopt a naturalist perspective and not agree that humans are just machines ("chemical scum"). You cannot cherry pick if you are a naturalist and yet I manage to see people repeatedly attempt to inject their own belief system into what they call "naturalism". Things they throw around but do not fit within the tenets of their professed belief:

Free will (define it -- soft determinism doesn't count)
Mental causation (is it not inert if the physiological is all that matters?)
Consciousness (as something non-illusory, a byproduct)
Qualia (measure this in scientific terms or else it doesn't exist)
Responsibility for actions (in a cause and effect deterministic system, I don't know how you could *ever* say this exists or at least the individual has any "personal" responsibility)

I am a dualist and I respect the naturalist's right to an opinion, but I question whether they fully appreciate the view they advocate or whether it is adopted for some other reason(s).

Causality and the existence of consciousness are two separate issues. You can have consciousness (as defined by the existence of qualia) in a fully determinate universe. Science doesn't necessarily preclude qualia either: It's not possible to give a physical account of economic laws even though they we can empirically verify they exist. To deny qualia is to deny the value of empirical experience, which in fact seems contrary to the premise of science.

Contrasting social sciences (so-called "economic laws") with something that almost every sane person on earth asserts the existence of (not too many people dispute the existence of consciousness) is not the greatest choice of approach IMO.

Anyways:
Science can know your own mind better than you can. At least, that is the truth according to Dennett, friends and fans. If that is true, and if you cannot measure qualia -- indeed if there are no laws* or functions*, nor is there any way to explain the 'indexicality' that you experience -- then what really makes you believe it exists at all? What makes you think consciousness exists as something non-illusory?

Is "empirically verifying they exist by experience" not an appeal to intuition? Is that not a rather weak argument, if not outright circular reasoning itself ("qualia exist because my experiencing of quale says so...") Is that 'scientific'?

Originally posted by: mrkun
Why must mental states be something other than physical in origin?

To borrow from Kripke: Is a stimulated c-fiber the same as thing as 'pain'? Can the stimulated c-fiber exist without 'pain'?

Originally posted by: mrkun
Are you aware of David Chalmer's theory of "non-reductive materialism" with regard to consciousness? I would suggest reading his book The Conscious Mind.

[/quote]
Coincidentally enough the day you posted that I had been re-reading sections of my copy. I do not agree with the positions he advocates although he makes the case for them very convincingly.



(* When I say no laws or functions of qualia, I mean the experience of 'what it is like', not the corresponding physiological happenings.)