Humans are essentially machines with programming

[NanoStuff]

Originally posted by: Xavier434
Given the progression of genetic and biological engineering just over the past 30 years, it wouldn't shock me at all to learn that we were designed by some other more advanced species and dumped on this rock. Seriously, if we are this far into the science now as opposed to where we were in 1980 can you imagine how far we will be by the year 3000?

I've been told of robot sex by 2025. At such pace by 3000 a considerable part of the galaxy's matter will be a massive unified intelligence.

 

[Miramonti]

Programmed? No.

Conditioned? Yes.

 

[imported_Imp]

Had to read a book on this in University: "Mind over machine". Even had to write an essay about it; long story short, I got ripped for saying humans are machines with very very complex programming. There's a lot of randomness and intuition, but most of it boils down to background calculations that are difficult to make rules for. Give it enough time and you can probably harness every rule we use.

Of course the TA/assistant Professor called bs on me saying machines can't have intuition and can't be random and so on.

 

[NanoStuff]

Originally posted by: Imp
Of course the TA/assistant Professor called bs on me saying machines can't have intuition and can't be random and so on.

Did you punch the fool in the face?

 

[dighn]

Originally posted by: Imp
Had to read a book on this in University: "Mind over machine". Even had to write an essay about it; long story short, I got ripped for saying humans are machines with very very complex programming. There's a lot of randomness and intuition, but most of it boils down to background calculations that are difficult to make rules for. Give it enough time and you can probably harness every rule we use.

Of course the TA/assistant Professor called bs on me saying machines can't have intuition and can't be random and so on.

What subject is this for? I can forgive him/her if it wasn't science/tech related

 

[0roo0roo]

http://www.amazon.com/Blank-Sl...l-Nature/dp/0670031518

 

[Flyback]

Originally posted by: Throckmorton
Being able to measure consciousness has nothing to do with whether it's real or not. Obviously I can't prove to you that I'm conscious, but I'm sure that I am, and I see no reason to believe that everyone else is an automaton that creates the illusion of consciousness.

Is not everything that is 'real' also measurable in our physical universe? Does it not dance into the realm of supernatural to say that there are things that cannot be measured in our objective, physical universe but still maintain that they exist and are 'real'?

 

[mrkun]

Originally posted by: Flyback

Originally posted by: mrkun

Originally posted by: Flyback
At first glance your thread will likely get laughed at and people will shrug you off, but I simply do not know how anyone can adopt a naturalist perspective and not agree that humans are just machines ("chemical scum"). You cannot cherry pick if you are a naturalist and yet I manage to see people repeatedly attempt to inject their own belief system into what they call "naturalism". Things they throw around but do not fit within the tenets of their professed belief:

Free will (define it -- soft determinism doesn't count)
Mental causation (is it not inert if the physiological is all that matters?)
Consciousness (as something non-illusory, a byproduct)
Qualia (measure this in scientific terms or else it doesn't exist)
Responsibility for actions (in a cause and effect deterministic system, I don't know how you could *ever* say this exists or at least the individual has any "personal" responsibility)

I am a dualist and I respect the naturalist's right to an opinion, but I question whether they fully appreciate the view they advocate or whether it is adopted for some other reason(s).

Causality and the existence of consciousness are two separate issues. You can have consciousness (as defined by the existence of qualia) in a fully determinate universe. Science doesn't necessarily preclude qualia either: It's not possible to give a physical account of economic laws even though they we can empirically verify they exist. To deny qualia is to deny the value of empirical experience, which in fact seems contrary to the premise of science.

Contrasting social sciences (so-called "economic laws") with something that almost every sane person on earth asserts the existence of (not too many people dispute the existence of consciousness) is not the greatest choice of approach IMO.

I think it's an apt analogy. Does any "sane" person dispute that supply and demand is an accurate descriptor of human behavior?

Originally posted by: Flyback
Anyways:
Science can know your own mind better than you can. At least, that is the truth according to Dennett, friends and fans. If that is true, and if you cannot measure qualia -- indeed if there are no laws* or functions*, nor is there any way to explain the 'indexicality' that you experience -- then what really makes you believe it exists at all? What makes you think consciousness exists as something non-illusory?

lol

Originally posted by: Flyback
Is "empirically verifying they exist by experience" not an appeal to intuition? Is that not a rather weak argument, if not outright circular reasoning itself ("qualia exist because my experiencing of quale says so...") Is that 'scientific'?

You've got me there. You said you're a dualist. What's your argument for the existence of qualia?

Originally posted by: Flyback

Originally posted by: mrkun
Why must mental states be something other than physical in origin?

To borrow from Kripke: Is a stimulated c-fiber the same as thing as 'pain'? Can the stimulated c-fiber exist without 'pain'?

I know next to nothing about the nervous system, but to my knowledge pain killers work by inhibiting certain chemical responses in the brain, which is subsequent to the stimulation of c-fibers. So, yes, the stimulated c-fiber can indeed exist without pain.

 

[Flyback]

Originally posted by: mrkun
You've got me there. You said you're a dualist. What's your argument for the existence of qualia?

Faith.

Originally posted by: mrkun
I know next to nothing about the nervous system, but to my knowledge pain killers work by inhibiting certain chemical responses in the brain, which is subsequent to the stimulation of c-fibers. So, yes, the stimulated c-fiber can indeed exist without pain.

I think you misinterpreted what I was posing to you: why is the consensus that the two are one in the same, though? Are they type-identical and if so, why?

Chalmers actually talks about Kripke's argument in his book The Conscious Mind (the idea that phenomenal mental states are not the same as brain aka physiological states). I'm surprised you didn't catch on Go dust it off now that you have post-exam time

 

[mrkun]

Originally posted by: Flyback

Originally posted by: mrkun
You've got me there. You said you're a dualist. What's your argument for the existence of qualia?

Faith.

That's an argument?

Originally posted by: Flyback

Originally posted by: mrkun
I know next to nothing about the nervous system, but to my knowledge pain killers work by inhibiting certain chemical responses in the brain, which is subsequent to the stimulation of c-fibers. So, yes, the stimulated c-fiber can indeed exist without pain.

I think you misinterpreted what I was posing to you: why is the consensus that the two are one in the same, though? Are they type-identical and if so, why?

Whose consensus is this?

Originally posted by: Flyback
Chalmers actually talks about Kripke's argument in his book The Conscious Mind (the idea that phenomenal mental states are not the same as brain aka physiological states). I'm surprised you didn't catch on Go dust it off now that you have post-exam time

I'd agree with that. Like I said earlier, I haven't studied any of this stuff in two years or something. I actually loaned my copy of the book to some dude in North Hollywood and I haven't seen him in over a year, so rereading it isn't an option. lol

 

[KK]

We are who we thought we were.

 

[Flyback]

Originally posted by: mrkun

Originally posted by: Flyback

Originally posted by: mrkun
You've got me there. You said you're a dualist. What's your argument for the existence of qualia?

Faith.

That's an argument?

Are not the axioms of predicate logic that a naturalist would assume for debate just as much faith based as is my own personal belief, just a different variety?

Back on topic: the whole point is that I was never arguing for the existence of qualia from an objective and scientific point of view. I was challenging it and merely pointing out what I feel are some of the inconsistencies (using 'experience' to prove 'experience' of qualia and not a measurable and objective system) and in doing so am not necessarily required to defend my own position (in order to challenge another).

I will fully admit that I take an uneven playing field in assuming dualism; I don't think we can even agree on some premise to debate, really, because I'm on a totally different (radical?) end of the spectrum. I acknowledge this.

Originally posted by: mrkun

Originally posted by: Flyback

Originally posted by: mrkun
I know next to nothing about the nervous system, but to my knowledge pain killers work by inhibiting certain chemical responses in the brain, which is subsequent to the stimulation of c-fibers. So, yes, the stimulated c-fiber can indeed exist without pain.

I think you misinterpreted what I was posing to you: why is the consensus that the two are one in the same, though? Are they type-identical and if so, why?

Whose consensus is this?

I thought reductive physicalism was *by far* the most dominant theory promoted by non-theists and non-deists--the belief that there are no things in existence other than physical things?

I guess you got me there, if you argue for non-reductive physicalism (I did not think that position was altogether common, though.)

 

[KLin]

Originally posted by: KK
We are who we thought we were.

If you want to crown our asses, then crown'em!! :|

 

[Throckmorton]

Originally posted by: Flyback

Originally posted by: Throckmorton
Being able to measure consciousness has nothing to do with whether it's real or not. Obviously I can't prove to you that I'm conscious, but I'm sure that I am, and I see no reason to believe that everyone else is an automaton that creates the illusion of consciousness.

Is not everything that is 'real' also measurable in our physical universe? Does it not dance into the realm of supernatural to say that there are things that cannot be measured in our objective, physical universe but still maintain that they exist and are 'real'?

No, everything that is real is not measurable as far as I know. Besides that, just because we don't understand how consciousness works does not mean that it doesn't exist or is an illusion. Hell, in order to BE an illusion, there has to be a consciousness to experience the illusion.

And I can measure my own consciousness, and state with confidence that it does exist.

 

[mrkun]

Originally posted by: Flyback

Originally posted by: mrkun

Originally posted by: Flyback

Originally posted by: mrkun
You've got me there. You said you're a dualist. What's your argument for the existence of qualia?

Faith.

That's an argument?

Are not the axioms of predicate logic that a naturalist would assume for debate just as much faith based as is my own personal belief, just a different variety?

I don't think so. Arguments need to be predicated (no pun intended) on certain rules, in this case those of logic. The established rules aren't arbitrary however; they're set up in such a way that they yield consistent results that accurately describe natural phenomena (I realize I'm making certain assumptions here, but I think they're justifiable). Sure, you can define a set of logical rules any way you like, but they won't have the same functional (no pun intended once again) value. In other words, we're dependent on these rules in order to derive useful conclusions. We're not necessarily dependent on the existence of qualia. So to answer your question more directly, I think the assumption that the axioms of predicate logic are true is more justifiable than the position that consciousness exists, although I'm not making any claim as to how much (lol).

Originally posted by: Flyback
Back on topic: the whole point is that I was never arguing for the existence of qualia from an objective and scientific point of view. I was challenging it and merely pointing out what I feel are some of the inconsistencies (using 'experience' to prove 'experience' of qualia and not a measurable and objective system) and in doing so am not necessarily required to defend my own position (in order to challenge another).

I will fully admit that I take an uneven playing field in assuming dualism; I don't think we can even agree on some premise to debate, really, because I'm on a totally different (radical?) end of the spectrum. I acknowledge this.

So basically you feel that dualism is a justifiable position because physicalism/materialism/naturalism is insufficient to account for phenomena that you feel are self-evident. You don't think this is fallacious though? Back to predicate logic: If materialism is false, then consciousness is true; consciousness is true; therefore materialism is false.

Originally posted by: Flyback

Originally posted by: mrkun

Originally posted by: Flyback

Originally posted by: mrkun
I know next to nothing about the nervous system, but to my knowledge pain killers work by inhibiting certain chemical responses in the brain, which is subsequent to the stimulation of c-fibers. So, yes, the stimulated c-fiber can indeed exist without pain.

I think you misinterpreted what I was posing to you: why is the consensus that the two are one in the same, though? Are they type-identical and if so, why?

Whose consensus is this?

I thought reductive physicalism was *by far* the most dominant theory promoted by non-theists and non-deists--the belief that there are no things in existence other than physical things?

I guess you got me there, if you argue for non-reductive physicalism (I did not think that position was altogether common, though.)

Oh, I understand the argument. My point was just that it's a bad analogy. To say that C-fiber stimulation is the same as pain is to just illustrate one's lack of knowledge of the nervous system.

 

[everman]

well in that case I'd like to do a few upgrades.

 

[mrkun]

Originally posted by: everman
well in that case I'd like to do a few upgrades.

We're really not that far off from that. We've already got cosmetic surgery and things like LASIK.

 

[NanoStuff]

Originally posted by: mrkun

Originally posted by: everman
well in that case I'd like to do a few upgrades.

We're really not that far off from that. We've already got cosmetic surgery and things like LASIK.

A nose job isn't exactly in the same class of technology as brain enhancement.

 

[mrkun]

Originally posted by: NanoStuff

Originally posted by: mrkun

Originally posted by: everman
well in that case I'd like to do a few upgrades.

We're really not that far off from that. We've already got cosmetic surgery and things like LASIK.

A nose job isn't exactly in the same class of technology as brain enhancement.

Of course not. Cosmetic surgery is just that -- cosmetic. Laser eye surgery does provide a functional enhancement though. Artificial limbs and internal organs are another example; although they're currently inferior to natural ones, they may be superior at some point in the future. And then there's genetic engineering too.

 

[NanoStuff]

Originally posted by: mrkun
they may be superior at some point in the future. And then there's genetic engineering too.

There's no maybe about it, it's all in the time frames. It's going to be a while I suspect.

 

[Rubycon]

No but there could be machines out there programmed to be human.