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The two most interesting sections are, of course, the Iranian Responses and Wider Responses.
The report also discusses the difference in responses in an attack by the US versus an attack by Israel (which in this case would be very little, since the two would be in collaboration in this situation).
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Iranian Responses
Redevelopment of nuclear programme. However badly Iran?s nuclear infrastructure was damaged in an attack, an immediate response would be to reconstitute the infrastructure and work rapidly and in secret towards a clear nuclear weapons capability. This would probably involve giving formal notice of withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, followed by the immediate reconstitution of the nuclear infrastructure, developing it wherever possible in a more survivable manner. This would include systems redundancy, dispersal of research, development and production capabilities and the use of deep underground facilities for future work wherever feasible.
Furthermore, there may already be elements of redundancy built in to the current Iranian civil nuclear programme and there may be elements of which the United States is unaware. If so, this would aid the reconstitution of capabilities. More generally, any hope of negotiating away Iran?s suspected nuclear weapons programme in the years after a US attack would vanish, undermining global non-proliferation efforts. Rather than living with an Iran that had the potential to produce nuclear weapons, the US action would almost certainly guarantee an overtly nuclear-armed Iran for decades to come or, alternatively, further instances of military action.
Hezbollah. Iran would be likely to encourage more militant action by Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. Given that Hezbollah now has large quantities of surface-to-surface missiles of a range sufficient to reach Haifa and other population centres in the north of Israel, a vigorous Israeli response should be expected, further adding to an atmosphere of crisis. It is true that Hezbollah is currently undergoing a period of substantial political transformation, moving more firmly into the social and political arenas, so that major military action against Israel would be a regression to previous patterns. This is to be expected, though, given the likely extent of the popular support for Iran resulting from US military action.
Any action from Hezbollah would result in substantial Israeli military responses. At the very least these would involve air strikes, the use of artillery and battlefield missiles and naval bombardment. They might extend to cross-border operations by infantry and armoured units.
Straits of Hormuz. While one major aim of any US military action would be to forestall Iranian interference with Gulf oil exports, this would have to be near total in its effect on Iranian capabilities. This would be difficult if not impossible to achieve, leading to a fear of attack which alone would have a formidable impact on oil markets.
West Gulf oil facilities. Furthermore, it would be possible for paramilitary units linked to Iran to develop the ability to sabotage oil export facilities in western Gulf states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. High levels of security would undoubtedly be maintained in these states, yet determined paramilitary groups would be difficult to control with certainty. Even one or two incidents of sabotage would raise tensions and further affect oil markets.
Revolutionary Guard. The Revolutionary Guard remains a strong if largely free-standing component of the Iranian defence system. While its facilities on the Persian Gulf coast and close to the border with Iran might be damaged in the early waves of US attacks, there would also be a very substantial base of support for the Guard, expressed by immediate improvements in morale, a greatly enhanced ability to recruit, and a determination to respond. Although US military action against Guard facilities might be undertaken to ?warn off? the Guard from interfering in Iraq, the effect would almost certainly be shortlived, and the numerous links which already exist between Guard units and Iraqi Shi?a militias would be activated rapidly. Such demonstrable Iranian involvement in the Iraqi insurgency would result in an escalating US military response involving cross-border attacks on Iranian logistics. This would increase Iranian civilian casualties, cause economic disruption and also further increase internal Iranian support for the current regime.
Overall, and given the nature of the Iran/Iraq border, Iran would be in a very strong position to aid elements of the Iraqi insurgency in numerous ways, providing a wide range of armaments as well as personnel. This would give a substantial boost to an insurgency that, even three years after the termination of the old regime, is as active as ever.
Wider Responses
The consequences described above relate to the immediate responses from within Iran or from associates in Lebanon. Probably the most difficult response to predict would be the effect of a military confrontation with Iran on the attitudes and reactions from within wider Islamic communities. Although there is an uneasy relationship between Iran and the al-Qaida movement, and between Iran and the Arab world, any attack on such a significant Islamic republic would inevitably increase the anti-American mood in the region and beyond, giving greater impetus to a movement that is already a global phenomenon.
One of the most significant developments of the past four years has been the ability of the al-Qaida movement and its associates to survive and thrive in an intensely antagonistic environment. Since 9/11, the movement has experienced the loss of many key leadership elements, either killed or detained, has lost its main operating areas in Afghanistan and has seen over 70,000 people detained for lengthy periods. Even so, the level of activity in those past four years has actually been substantially higher than in the four years prior to the 9/11 attacks.
Of particular significance has been the evolution of suicide bombing. Historically, this phenomenon has been widespread and has not been restricted to radical Islamist groups, but individual campaigns involving suicide bombing have been narrow in their geographical focus. These have included the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, Kurdish separatists in Turkey, Hezbollah supporters in Southern Lebanon and Palestinian radicals in Israel/Palestine. These have all been directed at responding to occupation and perceived oppression in a localised region.
For the first time, at least on a substantial scale, suicide bombing has gone transnational, often involving well-educated individuals who are motivated to respond not to their known immediate circumstances but to the wider circumstances of co-religionists. They are aided by the huge increase in information now available through satellite TV news channels and the internet, and may be prepared to travel substantial distances to undertake their actions.
If the United States is prepared to extend its current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to Iran, this trend should be expected to get a substantial further boost, with consequences that are difficult to predict. It will certainly be yet another example of a reaction that will serve to damage US security interests in the region and beyond.
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The gist of the situation: the US is not in an advantageous position to attack Iran. Given the obvious failures in the war on terror (with terrorist and insurgent activity far exceeding pre-war levels in both Afghanistan, Iraq, and abroad), and with the US military seriously occupied in Iraq and Afghanistan, any attack on Iran would put our military in a tough situation. Of course, our military might far outweighs that of Iran; but military might does not play a factor in long occupations, and Iran would make our occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan hell on earth. Couple this with the huge effect on oil prices that a conflict with Iran would cause, and it is easy to see why a military attack on Iran is not in the American people's best interest.
But (and this is a big but), the situation would still be in Bush's best interest. A spike in oil prices and a dramatic increase in military expenditure is exactly what he and his cronies want.
The two most interesting sections are, of course, the Iranian Responses and Wider Responses.
The report also discusses the difference in responses in an attack by the US versus an attack by Israel (which in this case would be very little, since the two would be in collaboration in this situation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iranian Responses
Redevelopment of nuclear programme. However badly Iran?s nuclear infrastructure was damaged in an attack, an immediate response would be to reconstitute the infrastructure and work rapidly and in secret towards a clear nuclear weapons capability. This would probably involve giving formal notice of withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, followed by the immediate reconstitution of the nuclear infrastructure, developing it wherever possible in a more survivable manner. This would include systems redundancy, dispersal of research, development and production capabilities and the use of deep underground facilities for future work wherever feasible.
Furthermore, there may already be elements of redundancy built in to the current Iranian civil nuclear programme and there may be elements of which the United States is unaware. If so, this would aid the reconstitution of capabilities. More generally, any hope of negotiating away Iran?s suspected nuclear weapons programme in the years after a US attack would vanish, undermining global non-proliferation efforts. Rather than living with an Iran that had the potential to produce nuclear weapons, the US action would almost certainly guarantee an overtly nuclear-armed Iran for decades to come or, alternatively, further instances of military action.
Hezbollah. Iran would be likely to encourage more militant action by Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. Given that Hezbollah now has large quantities of surface-to-surface missiles of a range sufficient to reach Haifa and other population centres in the north of Israel, a vigorous Israeli response should be expected, further adding to an atmosphere of crisis. It is true that Hezbollah is currently undergoing a period of substantial political transformation, moving more firmly into the social and political arenas, so that major military action against Israel would be a regression to previous patterns. This is to be expected, though, given the likely extent of the popular support for Iran resulting from US military action.
Any action from Hezbollah would result in substantial Israeli military responses. At the very least these would involve air strikes, the use of artillery and battlefield missiles and naval bombardment. They might extend to cross-border operations by infantry and armoured units.
Straits of Hormuz. While one major aim of any US military action would be to forestall Iranian interference with Gulf oil exports, this would have to be near total in its effect on Iranian capabilities. This would be difficult if not impossible to achieve, leading to a fear of attack which alone would have a formidable impact on oil markets.
West Gulf oil facilities. Furthermore, it would be possible for paramilitary units linked to Iran to develop the ability to sabotage oil export facilities in western Gulf states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. High levels of security would undoubtedly be maintained in these states, yet determined paramilitary groups would be difficult to control with certainty. Even one or two incidents of sabotage would raise tensions and further affect oil markets.
Revolutionary Guard. The Revolutionary Guard remains a strong if largely free-standing component of the Iranian defence system. While its facilities on the Persian Gulf coast and close to the border with Iran might be damaged in the early waves of US attacks, there would also be a very substantial base of support for the Guard, expressed by immediate improvements in morale, a greatly enhanced ability to recruit, and a determination to respond. Although US military action against Guard facilities might be undertaken to ?warn off? the Guard from interfering in Iraq, the effect would almost certainly be shortlived, and the numerous links which already exist between Guard units and Iraqi Shi?a militias would be activated rapidly. Such demonstrable Iranian involvement in the Iraqi insurgency would result in an escalating US military response involving cross-border attacks on Iranian logistics. This would increase Iranian civilian casualties, cause economic disruption and also further increase internal Iranian support for the current regime.
Overall, and given the nature of the Iran/Iraq border, Iran would be in a very strong position to aid elements of the Iraqi insurgency in numerous ways, providing a wide range of armaments as well as personnel. This would give a substantial boost to an insurgency that, even three years after the termination of the old regime, is as active as ever.
Wider Responses
The consequences described above relate to the immediate responses from within Iran or from associates in Lebanon. Probably the most difficult response to predict would be the effect of a military confrontation with Iran on the attitudes and reactions from within wider Islamic communities. Although there is an uneasy relationship between Iran and the al-Qaida movement, and between Iran and the Arab world, any attack on such a significant Islamic republic would inevitably increase the anti-American mood in the region and beyond, giving greater impetus to a movement that is already a global phenomenon.
One of the most significant developments of the past four years has been the ability of the al-Qaida movement and its associates to survive and thrive in an intensely antagonistic environment. Since 9/11, the movement has experienced the loss of many key leadership elements, either killed or detained, has lost its main operating areas in Afghanistan and has seen over 70,000 people detained for lengthy periods. Even so, the level of activity in those past four years has actually been substantially higher than in the four years prior to the 9/11 attacks.
Of particular significance has been the evolution of suicide bombing. Historically, this phenomenon has been widespread and has not been restricted to radical Islamist groups, but individual campaigns involving suicide bombing have been narrow in their geographical focus. These have included the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, Kurdish separatists in Turkey, Hezbollah supporters in Southern Lebanon and Palestinian radicals in Israel/Palestine. These have all been directed at responding to occupation and perceived oppression in a localised region.
For the first time, at least on a substantial scale, suicide bombing has gone transnational, often involving well-educated individuals who are motivated to respond not to their known immediate circumstances but to the wider circumstances of co-religionists. They are aided by the huge increase in information now available through satellite TV news channels and the internet, and may be prepared to travel substantial distances to undertake their actions.
If the United States is prepared to extend its current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to Iran, this trend should be expected to get a substantial further boost, with consequences that are difficult to predict. It will certainly be yet another example of a reaction that will serve to damage US security interests in the region and beyond.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The gist of the situation: the US is not in an advantageous position to attack Iran. Given the obvious failures in the war on terror (with terrorist and insurgent activity far exceeding pre-war levels in both Afghanistan, Iraq, and abroad), and with the US military seriously occupied in Iraq and Afghanistan, any attack on Iran would put our military in a tough situation. Of course, our military might far outweighs that of Iran; but military might does not play a factor in long occupations, and Iran would make our occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan hell on earth. Couple this with the huge effect on oil prices that a conflict with Iran would cause, and it is easy to see why a military attack on Iran is not in the American people's best interest.
But (and this is a big but), the situation would still be in Bush's best interest. A spike in oil prices and a dramatic increase in military expenditure is exactly what he and his cronies want.