It's official, BlackBoxVoting is going public with fraud claims

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Votingisanillusion

Senior member
Nov 6, 2004
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'Stinking Evidence' of Possible Election Fraud Found in Florida

And then things got even odder.

"We were sitting there comparing the real [signed, original] tapes with the [later printout] ones that were given us," Bev said, "and finding things missing and finding things not matching, when one of the elections employees took a bin full of things that looked like garbage - that looked like polling tapes, actually - and passed by and disappeared out the back of the building."

This provoked investigator Ellen Brodsky to walk outside and check the garbage of the Elections Office itself. Sure enough - more original, signed poll tapes, freshly trashed.

"And I must tell you," Bev said, "that whatever they had taken out [the back door] just came right back in the front door and we said, 'What are these polling place tapes doing in your dumpster?'"

A November 18 call to the Volusia County Elections Office found that Elections Supervisor Deanie Lowe was unavailable and nobody was willing to speak on the record with an out-of-state reporter. However, The Daytona Beach News (in Volusia County), in a November 17th article by staff writer Christine Girardin, noted, "Harris went to the Department of Elections' warehouse on State Road 44 in DeLand on Tuesday to inspect original Nov. 2 polling place tapes, after being given a set of reprints dated Nov. 15. While there, Harris saw Nov. 2 polling place tapes in a garbage bag, heightening her concern about the integrity of voting records."

The Daytona Beach News further noted that, "[Elections Supervisor] Lowe confirmed Wednesday some backup copies of tapes from the Nov. 2 election were destined for the shredder," but pointed out that, according to Lowe, that was simply because there were two sets of tapes produced on election night, each signed. "One tape is delivered in one car along with the ballots and a memory card," the News reported. "The backup tape is delivered to the elections office in a second car."

Suggesting that duplicates don't need to be kept, Lowe claims that Harris didn't want to hear an explanation of why some signed poll tapes would be in the garbage. "She's not wanting to listen to an explanation," Lowe told the News of Harris. "She has her own ideas."

But the Ollie North action in two locations on two days was only half of the surprise that awaited Bev and her associates. When they compared the discarded, signed, original tapes with the recent printouts submitted to the state and used to tabulate the Florida election winners, Harris says a disturbing pattern emerged.

"The difference was hundreds of votes in each of the different places we examined," said Bev, "and most of those were in minority areas."

When I asked Bev if the errors they were finding in precinct after precinct were random, as one would expect from technical, clerical, or computer errors, she became uncomfortable.

"You have to understand that we are non-partisan," she said. "We're not trying to change the outcome of an election, just to find out if there was any voting fraud."

That said, Bev added: "The pattern was very clear. The anomalies favored George W. Bush. Every single time."

Of course finding possible voting "anomalies" in one Florida county doesn't mean they'll show up in all counties. It's even conceivable there are innocent explanations for both the mismatched counts and trashed original records; this story undoubtedly will continue to play out. And, unless further investigation demonstrates a pervasive and statewide trend toward "anomalous" election results in many of Florida's counties, odds are none of this will change the outcome of the election (which exit polls showed John Kerry winning in Florida).

Nonetheless, Bev and her merry band are off to hit another county.

As she told me on her cell phone while driving toward their next destination, "We just put Volusia County and their lawyers on notice that they need to continue to keep a number of documents under seal, including all of the memory cards to the ballot boxes, and all of the signed poll tapes."

Why?

"Simple," she said. "Because we found anomalies indicative of fraud."
 

Darkhawk28

Diamond Member
Dec 22, 2000
6,759
0
0
The following is clear, plain and simple case of FRAUD...

The tinfoil hat has now been taken off, wadded up in a ball and thrown straight in the trash...

Black Box Voting... See Update for Tuesday, November 23.

Summary of allegations

a. The Supervisor of Elections has unreasonably delayed providing information.

b. The certification was based on inadequate and incomplete information regarding the election results.

6. Some or all of the information requested on Nov. 2, 2004 by Black Box Voting is still missing from 59 of the 179 voting precincts, including portions of or all of the voting machine tapes for those 59 precincts, which are a vital part of official paper record of the election results from those precincts.

7. Complete information on problems with the voting machines prior to and during the election has not been provided.

8. Complete information relating to memory card failures during the election has not yet been provided.

9. Only a partial list of the transmission logs from the Accu-Vote optical scan server has been provided. Despite repeated requests, the Elections office has refused to provide to the Volusia County Democratic party the official election results, now stating that those results will not be available until December 1, 2004.

10. The Elections office has provided incomplete data regarding Early Voting and Absentee ballots. The Supervisor of Elections, for example, reported that the total number of absentee ballots and Early voting ballots, combined equaled 89,999 votes, yet the published figures for those totals is 84,100 votes, leaving over 5,800 votes unaccounted for.

11. In addition to the pattern of delay in providing the requested information, the true election results are in doubt because of numerous violations of election law procedure and unanswered questions concerning the results.

12. The polls were opened early and closed late during Early Voting.

13. Many public records, including one signed results tape from a voting machine were found in the trash. Many of the requested records not furnished by the Elections office have been found in the trash. Results from the tapes found in the trash do not match the results of the copies of tapes furnished.

14. An email from Mark Earley, of Diebold Elections Systems, Inc., to the Elections office was provided which asked the recipient for an explanation of why Volusia County had more memory card failures than all of their other Florida customers combined, and then asked why the 17 memory card failures which the Elections office reported on November 3, increased to 25 before November 12, 2004.

15. The reported memory card failures were significant and troubling and included reporting zero votes after one week of voting, requesting permission to upload votes before the voting began, and messaging whether the card should be reformatted.

16. According to a statement by the Supervisor of Elections on November 17, 2004, the GEMS computer is not networked, and is "stand alone." The furnished computer logs show evidence of at least two attempts to remotely access the GEMS central tabulator, which is claimed to be secure. A computer screen shot printout on November 17, 2004 (found in the trash) shows that the GEMS computer at that time had two networked hard drives.


Plus, there's a lawsuit now pending....

Volusia Lawsuit

Susan Rose Pynchon vs. Volusia County Canvassing Board and Ann McFall
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA
IN AND FOR VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLORIDA

SUSAN ROSE PYNCHON,
Plaintiff

Vs.

VOLUSIA COUNTY CANVASSING BOARD
And ANN McFALL,
Defendants

____________________________________

COMPLAINT TO CONTEST ELECTION

Plaintiff, Susan Rose Pynchon, sues the Volusia County Canvassing Board and Ann McFall, defendants, and alleges:

1. This is an action brought under section 102,168, Florida Statutes (2004), to contest the certification that Ann McFall received more votes in the November 2 General Election in Volusia County, Florida, than did Patricia Northey.

2. Plaintiff is an elector resident and qualified to vote in Volusia County, Florida, residing at (redacted address).

3. Defendant Volusia County Canvassing Board consists of Joie Alexander, Member of the Volusia County Council, the Honorable Steven deLarouche, County Judge, and Deanie Lowe, Supervisor of Elections.

4. Defendant Ann McFall, (redacted address), is the candidate certified by the defendant Canvassing Board to have won the November 2, 2004 election for Supervisor of Elections.

5. Plaintiff has been informed that the Volusia County Canvassing Board certified the election results on November 12, 2004. Plaintiff is aware that the statutory deadline for filing this complaint is ten days following the date of that certification. Plaintiff alleges, however, that this complaint should be deemed timely filed for two reasons:

a. The Supervisor of Elections has unreasonably delayed providing information on which this complaint must be based, and still has not provided all of that information. The Canvassing Board is therefore estopped from asserting an untimely filing of this complaint.

b. The certification was based on inadequate and incomplete information regarding the election results, as will more particularly appear, and is, therefore, an invalid certification of those results.

6. A copy of the public records request emailed and faxed to the Supervisor of Elections on November 2, 2004, is attached. Some or all of the information requested is still missing from 59 of the 179 voting precincts, including portions of or all of the voting machine tapes for those 59 precincts, which are a vital part of official paper record of the election results from those precincts.

7. Complete information on problems with the voting machines prior to and during the election has not been provided.

8. Complete information relating to memory card failures during the election has not yet been provided.

9. Only a partial list of the transmission logs from the Accu-Vote optical scan server has been provided. Despite repeated requests, the Elections office has refused to provide to the Volusia County Democratic party the official election results, now stating that those results will not be available until December 1, 2004.

10. The Elections office has provided incomplete data regarding Early Voting and Absentee ballots. The Supervisor of Elections, for example, reported that the total number of absentee ballots and Early voting ballots, combined equaled 89,999 votes, yet the published figures for those totals is 84,100 votes, leaving over 5,800 votes unaccounted for.

11. Section 102, 168(3)(a) Florida Statutes (2004) provides that an election may be set aside for "misconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of any election official or any member of the canvassing board sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election."

12. In Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Board, et al, 707 S. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998) the Florida Supreme Court said: "... if a court finds substantial noncompliance with statutory election procedures and also makes a factual determination that reasonable doubt exists as to whether a certified election expressed the will of the voters, then the court in an election contest brought pursuant to section 102.168, Florida Statutes (1997), is to void the contested election even in the absence of fraud or intentional wrongdoing."

13. In addition to the pattern of delay in providing the requested information, the true election results are in doubt because of numerous violations of election law procedure and unanswered questions concerning the results.

14. The polls were opened early and closed late during Early Voting.

15. Many public records, including one signed results tape from a voting machine were found in the trash. Many of the requested records not furnished by the Elections office have been found in the trash. Results from the tapes found in the trash do not match the results of the copies of tapes furnished.

16. An email from Mark Earley, of Diebold Elections Systems, Inc., to the Elections office was provided which asked the recipient for an explanation of why Volusia County had more memory card failures than all of their other Florida customers combined, and then asked why the 17 memory card failures which the Elections office reported on November 3, increased to 25 before November 12, 2004.

17. The reported memory card failures were significant and troubling and included reporting zero votes after one week of voting, requesting permission to upload votes before the voting began, and messaging whether the card should be reformatted.

18. According to a statement by the Supervisor of Elections on November 17, 2004, the GEMS computer is not networked, and is "stand alone." The furnished computer logs show evidence of at least two attempts to remotely access the GEMS central tabulator, which is claimed to be secure. A computer screen shot printout on November 17, 2004 (found in the trash) shows that the GEMS computer at that time had two networked hard drives.

19. Plaintiff is reasonably concerned that access to the memory cards and voting machine tapes is presently not restricted, and that the opportunity for tampering with that critical evidence exists. Plaintiff accordingly requests that This Honorable Court immediately order the Supervisor of Elections to seal and sequester all memory cards and voting machine tapes pertaining to or used during the November 2, 2004 general election in Volusia County, during the pendency of this Cause.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this court order the immediate sealing of all memory cards and voting machine tapes pertaining to or used during the November 2, 2004 general election, and after hearing the evidence in this cause, set aside that general election of November 2, 2004.

SUSAN ROSE PYNCHON

DANIEL R. VAUGHEN, P.A.
Attorney for Plaintiff
Fla. Bar No. 083486


I'm 100% positive that this is just the tip of the iceberg.
 

conjur

No Lifer
Jun 7, 2001
58,686
3
0
Bit of an update:
Renton elections activist Bev Harris has been called a fruitcake and a muckraker. Her book and Web site about the hidden evils of modern election equipment have drawn the ire of a number of officials around the country, who say there is nothing to Harris' claims that elections systems are profoundly vulnerable to hackers and other tampering.

"Dean Logan is not fond of me," Harris says of King County's director of elections.

But not everyone thinks all of Harris' claims are "a bunch of poppycock," as she puts it: The attorney general of California recently took up a whistle-blower claim filed by Harris against Diebold Election Systems and settled with the company for $2.6 million in December.

Diebold provides the systems used to tally votes and register voters in King County and in many other counties around the country.

The whistle-blower lawsuit, filed by Harris in November 2003 and taken up by the California attorney general in September, said Diebold engaged in unfair business practices and made false claims about its product.

It alleged that Diebold used uncertified software in elections in California. The settlement requires the company to pay millions back to a number of counties and replace some equipment, among other things.

Harris said the settlement "is a good sign. It certainly vindicated that our criticisms had validity."

Harris said many of the allegations she made in her suit were not included in the complaint filed by the attorney general. She said she has filed another lawsuit to address those issues.

Harris, author of "Black Box Voting: Ballot Tampering in the 21st Century," said her research shows that the elections systems used here in King County and around the country could easily have been hacked -- and that King County's system might have been hacked during the recent primary election.



Logan said in an earlier interview that he disagreed with Harris' allegations about the primary.

"The observations and linkages she makes don't add up. We feel very confident that the outcome of the primary was proper, and the data we have backs up the results for that election," he said.

Harris' research and theories are popular: Her Web site -- www.blackboxvoting.org -- gets millions of visitors every week; her book quickly sold out of its first printing of 5,000 and is on back order now.

Harris said she discovered a hoard of internal Diebold memos and some Diebold source code while clicking around on the Internet a few years ago. She went from anonymous activist to media darling soon after posting the documents online.

Harris is waiting to hear what part of the California settlement she will net as one of two whistle-blowers who originally filed the suit.

She says she's hoping to receive about $75,000, which she says she will put into a dedicated fund to bankroll more legal action relating to the use of elections equipment.

Harris said she has plans to continue her research into the insecurity of modern election systems.

Vote machine maker settles over her whistle-blower suit
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/.../209250_diebold25.html
 

conjur

No Lifer
Jun 7, 2001
58,686
3
0
Company sues Blackwell over voting machines
http://news.enquirer.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050202/NEWS01/502030306
A Texas-based company sued Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell this morning for ordering county election boards across the state to abandon plans for electronic voting machines.

Hart InterCivic Inc.'s eSlate voting machine was selected in 2004 by Hamilton County and seven other Ohio counties.

However, Blackwell said Jan. 12 that the General Assembly's passage of a bill last May requiring all machines to have a voter verifiable paper trail has made the move to electronic voting too slow and expensive. He ordered all county election boards to instead select an optical-scan system - in which voters fill in ovals with No. 2 pencils - by Feb. 9.

They must choose between optical-scan systems offered by Diebold Elections Systems and ES&S - the only two certified by Blackwell's office. Hart InterCivic is developing an optical-scan system.

Hart InterCivic's lawsuit alleges the company spent $4.3 million working with state and county officials to offer its equipment in Ohio. The case was filed in Hamilton County Common Pleas Court.
While I'm glad to see a move to systems offering a paper trail, having Diebold as one of only two available vendors is more than a bit unnerving.
 

ciba

Senior member
Apr 27, 2004
812
0
71
Originally posted by: Darkhawk28
It's obvious there were a lot of discrepencies with these system around the country...

So why are people afraid of finding out the truth about them? the full truth? If it turns out to be nothing, then it's nothing. But if it does turn out to be something, then it needs to be fixed, PERIOD.

Like in Washington?
 

Darkhawk28

Diamond Member
Dec 22, 2000
6,759
0
0
Originally posted by: ciba
Originally posted by: Darkhawk28
It's obvious there were a lot of discrepencies with these system around the country...

So why are people afraid of finding out the truth about them? the full truth? If it turns out to be nothing, then it's nothing. But if it does turn out to be something, then it needs to be fixed, PERIOD.

Like in Washington?

Of course, why not?
 

ciba

Senior member
Apr 27, 2004
812
0
71
Originally posted by: Darkhawk28
Of course, why not?

Well, a certain party is saying the vote went off just fine. There have been a number of confirmed illegal votes (10x the difference in the governor's race). The illegality of these votes has been confirmed by county auditors and election officials.

Also, In my county (a democratic stronghold) there were several thousand more votes than voters. These types of things are patently wrong on their face. It takes no stastical analysis to know that your number of votes should be no more than the number of voters signed in at the polls.

While the problems should definitely be fixed, I think there is a difference between outright illegal votes and stasticial abnormalities. To put it on par with the governor's race in Washington, there would need to be 1,000,000 outright illegal votes in Ohio.
 

conjur

No Lifer
Jun 7, 2001
58,686
3
0
11,310 ballots cast out
Court rules voting outside home precinct is illegal; races in limbo
http://www.charlotte.com/mld/charlotte/news/politics/10825990.htm
RALEIGH - The N.C. Supreme Court ruled Friday that provisional ballots cast by voters outside their home precinct are illegal, throwing out 11,310 ballots and potentially overturning a statewide vote and local races across the state.

The decision leaves the race for state schools superintendent in limbo and raises questions about the Mecklenburg County commissioners' election.

The case now goes back to a Wake County court, but the ruling means the state's 100 counties will have to identify the errant ballots and subtract them from their totals. In Mecklenburg, for example, there were nearly 1,800 out-of-precinct provisional ballots that county officials will have to examine, count the votes in each race and subtract them from the results.

"It's causing a political crisis. It could leave our elections unresolved for months," said Bob Cordle, a Democratic member of the state Board of Elections from Charlotte.

Voters in the future will have to ensure they go to the correct precinct to cast a ballot.

Bill Fletcher, the Republican candidate for superintendent of public instruction who filed the lawsuit, said he was grateful for the decision and looking forward to the next step.

Democratic candidate June Atkinson, who was declared the winner by more than 8,000 votes, said she was confident she will end up as superintendent.

In Mecklenburg, then-commissioner Ruth Samuelson came in fourth in a race for three seats, losing by 955 votes, a margin smaller than the number of out-of-precinct votes. Her loss helped give Democrats a solid 6 to 3 majority on a previously Republican-controlled board.

"This doesn't change anything yet," she said. "It just means we're closer to knowing whether anything is going to change."

Similarly, Karl Adkins lost a race for Superior Court judge to Linwood Foust by 116 votes. Gov. Mike Easley recently appointed Adkins to a judgeship.

Mecklenburg County commissioner Bill James, who had joined in the lawsuit, was elated.

"If I weren't so sick," he wrote in a widely distributed e-mail, "I would do an end zone dance." James had gall bladder surgery Wednesday.

Mecklenburg County's out-of-precinct provisional ballots were included in the final tally and are locked in storage, separately from other ballots, said Michael Dickerson, the county's elections director. He is waiting on directions from the State Board of Elections before doing any recounting.

The court's ruling and its potential to upend a variety of races came just hours after the commissioner of agriculture's race was settled when Democrat Britt Cobb bowed out of the dispute involving more than 4,000 lost ballots in Carteret County.

The five justices who participated in the case, all Republicans, blamed the Democratic-controlled State Board of Elections for allowing out-of-precinct provisional ballots when the state's law and constitution forbid them.

"It is indeed unfortunate that the statutorily unauthorized actions of the State Board of Elections denied thousands of citizens the right to vote on Election Day," wrote Justice George Wainwright in a unanimous opinion.


Justices Sarah Parker, a Democrat, and Robert Edmunds, a Republican, did not participate in the case and did not disclose a reason. Edmunds is from Greensboro, as is one plaintiff, and Parker and Atkinson were both on the Democratic Party's slate of statewide candidates last fall.

Wainwright wrote that the court was powerless "to rectify the Board's unilateral decision to instruct voters to cast provisional ballots in a manner not authorized by state law. To permit unlawful votes to be counted along with lawful ballots in contested elections effectively `disenfranchises' those voters who cast legal ballots."

Provisional ballots are given out when a voter shows up and his or her name is not on the rolls. The ballots were used in the past to correct wrong addresses and other errors. After the vote-counting debacle in Florida in 2000, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act, which required provisional ballots under the idea that a voter could vote and officials could check later to see if the voter was eligible.

The General Assembly passed a corresponding state law, which the State Board of Elections interpreted to mean that anyone could go to any precinct in their county using a provisional ballot.

The Supreme Court is "disenfranchising a lot of voters who played by the rules," said Bob Hall of Democracy North Carolina, a campaign watchdog group.

Fletcher sued over the out-of-precinct ballots, with his lawyers highlighting where the state constitution says voters must cast ballots in their precinct. Lawyers for the state, though, said precincts determine what races a voter can vote in -- which state Senate district, for example -- not the specific building.

The state lawyers also emphasized that Fletcher's arguments would invalidate the more than 1 million early votes that were cast by voters outside their precincts. The Supreme Court ignored that issue, saying that early and absentee ballots were not at issue.

Atkinson, the Democratic candidate for state schools superintendent, said she didn't think the vote among the out-of-precinct provisional ballots was lop-sided enough to reverse the results in her race.

"I agree with (country music singer) Porter Wagoner," Atkinson said. "`I've enjoyed this as much as I can stand.'"

N.C. Court Ruling

WHAT HAPPENED? N.C. Supreme Court threw out 11,310 ballots cast outside the voters' home precincts.

WHAT'S NEXT? Case goes back to Wake County court, then counties count the improper ballots and delete them from November vote totals.

WHAT'S AT STAKE? Election of state superintendent of public instruction remains unsettled and questions raised about several local races statewide
 

arsbanned

Banned
Dec 12, 2003
4,853
0
0
Originally posted by: conjur
Company sues Blackwell over voting machines
http://news.enquirer.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050202/NEWS01/502030306
A Texas-based company sued Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell this morning for ordering county election boards across the state to abandon plans for electronic voting machines.

Hart InterCivic Inc.'s eSlate voting machine was selected in 2004 by Hamilton County and seven other Ohio counties.

However, Blackwell said Jan. 12 that the General Assembly's passage of a bill last May requiring all machines to have a voter verifiable paper trail has made the move to electronic voting too slow and expensive. He ordered all county election boards to instead select an optical-scan system - in which voters fill in ovals with No. 2 pencils - by Feb. 9.

They must choose between optical-scan systems offered by Diebold Elections Systems and ES&S - the only two certified by Blackwell's office. Hart InterCivic is developing an optical-scan system.

Hart InterCivic's lawsuit alleges the company spent $4.3 million working with state and county officials to offer its equipment in Ohio. The case was filed in Hamilton County Common Pleas Court.
While I'm glad to see a move to systems offering a paper trail, having Diebold as one of only two available vendors is more than a bit unnerving.

Doesn't Chuck Hagel own the other (or have a hand in its ownership)? Alarm bells have to be going off when the politicians own the voting machines. It's sets a VERY bad precedent.
 

conjur

No Lifer
Jun 7, 2001
58,686
3
0
Could be. I haven't researched into that. Wouldn't surprise me, though. Money is what runs this country, not representation.


Just look at the "Logic & Accuracy Test" going on in Broward County
2-21-2005 Broward County (FL) update
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/1954/3506.html
Black Box Voting investigators Bev Harris and Kathleen Wynne attended and videotapted a Logic & Accuracy test at Broward County.

1. About 120 ES&S touch-screens were set up for voting. All were positioned so that not a single observer could see the screens (even with binoculars and a zoom lens).

2. Several computers were in an adjacent central tabulator room. None of the central tabulators used were positioned so that any observer could see any part of the screen.

Broward County Supervisor of Elections Brenda Snipes attended the meeting, along with the Broward County counsel, and Judge Fred Berman. Shortly after documentary film Votergate (http://www.votergate.tv) filmmakers Russell Michaels and Simon Ardizzone arrived, Snipes brought in her own attorney.

Activists Ellen Brodsky, who reported that she represents VerifiedVoting.org, and Pedro Monteiro, a local computer programmer, also attended.

- Harris asked why no one was allowed to see any of the touch-screens. Craig Yagid, the IT worker for Broward County, said it was not possible to turn a single one to face observers. Snipes asked him to take the observers into the room to see the testing, but he hurried them past the live touch-screens to show them a machine that was not turned on.

He refused to turn it on, so the observers still could not see the machine register any votes. He did explain the testing procedure, which consisted of testing one, sometimes two votes on each machine. He declined to answer most questions and hurried the observers out of the room.

An ES&S employee sat at the central tabulator, wearing a red polo shirt similar to other county employees, with no name tag differentiating him from county workers. When Harris asked about policies allowing unmarked vendors to touch the votes, Supervisor Snipes first said this was a procedure that had been certified by the state of Florida, but later recanted and admitted it was just the voting system that had been certified.

Pedro asked how the county could know the system was recording votes accurately when there is no paper ballot and the software is proprietary, but was told it was not the appropriate place for such questions.

When Harris asked a different question -- whether the ES&S employee was required to sign his name on documents, as poll workers and other election officials are required to do, she was told her question was repetetive. Snipes said simply "no," and repeated that the ES&S employee is part of the contract for technical assistance. (At that time, he was operating the central tabulator unsupervised, and had total control of the election).

As observers continued to ask polite, calm questions, the lawyer for Snipes informed the election officials that they need not answer any more questions, since the law required only that they allow observers to see the testing.

Harris mentioned that they were not being allowed to "see" the testing, since neither the touch-screens nor the tabulators were positioned so that any part of the screen was visible.

No more questions...

Judge Berman replied that the part observers were supposed to "see" was the deliberations of the election officials, not necessarily the machines.

Observers were told to sit down and be quiet, and to write down any questions for answers at a later time.

After the "zero reports" were examined, election officials waited around for testing to finish and results to be printed. Since nothing was going on, Pedro asked more questions.

Pedro pointed to some of the machines being used for the L&A test. "Are any of these the machines that counted backwards after they reached 32,000 votes?" he asked. (Broward County says that because it set the limit incorrectly on a machine during the Nov. 2004 election, it began to count in reverse, but only on one ballot question -- a controversial gambling initiative).

He was told to put his questions in writing, as they did not want to take time out of the L&A test to answer him.

"Are you too busy to answer my questions?" he asked politely, "because right now you are just waiting around."

Supervisor Snipes immediately got up and went into an adjacent room and shut the door.

"Put it in writing," said Judge Berman.

Pedro pointed out that a court reporter or transcriber was there writing everything that was said.

"She is already putting everything in writing," he said. "Perhaps she can put my questions in writing so we can get answers today?"

The election officials shuffled and finally one said "Uh, no one can read her writing."

"Then why is she here?" Pedro asked quietly and politely.

"We are not here to discuss your personality disorder," said Judge Berman.

"Sir, it is not I that has a personality disorder. It is you that is reading a book during this meeting." Judge Berman had brought a Heather Graham novel with him, and had his nose buried in the book during the testing.

A portly man who was identified as Snipes' personal assistant hurried out of the building. Harris followed him out, and heard him urgently requesting assistance, she assumed from security.

It was not security, but the police who showed up, and they pulled both Ellen Brodsky and Pedro Monteiro aside to tell them they had received a report that they were disturbing the peace.

Pedro had been, at that time, standing quite far to the side of the room, chatting quietly with the ES&S employee, and Brodsky had committed the sin of standing up in order to hear better (she has a hearing impairment).

=====================================

Harris spoke with Jeremiah Akin, of Riverside County, California, who has attended many such Logic & Accuracy tests, equally obstructive.

"It's important to document this behavior on videotape," he said. Riverside has tried to block the public from recording their own obstructive behavior, which includes preventing observers from seeing the central tabulator at all, or even who is operating it.

Black Box Voting will therefore be putting clips of the Broward County L&A test online at this site. This may take a couple weeks, as we have a heavy travel schedule during the next ten days, and we need to experiment with file size issues.

"It is amazing to me that anyone at all believes these tests prove anything," Pedro observed.

He is correct. The way many L&A tests are conducted, they are no more than a ridiculous dog and pony show -- the bamboozling of America.
What a joke!
 

conjur

No Lifer
Jun 7, 2001
58,686
3
0
First, and update on the Volusia happenings:

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/
MONDAY FEB. 21, 2005: Volusia County Update

Volusia County: Volusia County elections worker Lana Hires has resigned. She wrote the famous Diebold memo about the minus 16,022 votes for Gore in 2000 (see Chapter 13 of the Black Box Voting book. Lana Hires was at the warehouse in November 2004 when Bev Harris and Kathleen Wynne found elections records, including a signed poll tape and a homemade ballot, in the warehouse trash. A county voter registration record, filled out by a voter, was found by Black Box Voting, Votergate producer Russell Michaels, and Pynchon in the street outside Hires's house, indicating that she had taken county election records home. Hires had a key to the ballot vault and 24-hour access to the building.

The lawsuit filed by Volusia County citizen Susan Pynchon (to set aside the Volusia County election based on irregularities) has been postponed again, to late March.

It appears that the Volusia certification was improper. The canvassing board certified the wrong numbers, with at least 400 votes not counted at all in precinct 215. On Nov. 15, the board added more than 400 votes to precinct 215, but did not adjust the certification. Also, though the board says it counted military absentee votes on Nov. 12, none of these votes were included in the totals certified by Volusia County. The board claims that it certified the election on Nov. 12 after working hours. If the court finds that the Nov. 12 date holds, it may deem Pynchon's suit to be untimely; if it finds that Nov. 13 holds, or that the election was improperly certified, the suit is likely to go forward.

Pynchon shared important auditing work with Black Box Voting investigators Bev Harris and Kathleen Wynne. Black Box Voting provided a satchel of public records to Pynchon, including 10 poll tapes sent to Black Box Voting by Volusia County in December, along with an explanation by former Volusia Supervisor of Elections Deanie Lowe that she had "forgotten" to provide them despite several public records request follow-ups. Pynchon provided several new auditing tips for Diebold systems, including information on security problems in the Diebold event logs for Volusia County, and improper accounting for Volusia's memory cards (electronic ballot boxes).


Then, the biggie:

In mid-February, Black Box Voting, together with computer experts and videographers, under the supervision of appropriate officials, proved that a real Diebold system can be hacked.

This was not theoretical or a "potential" vulnerability. Votes were hacked on a real system in a real location using the actual setup used on Election Day, Nov. 2, 2004.

In October, Black Box Voting published an article on this Web site about remote access into the Diebold system. After examining the Diebold software and related internal e-mails, local security professionals were able to demonstrate a hack into a simulated system.

In February, we were allowed to try various hacking techniques into a real election system. To our surprise, the method used in our October simulation did not work.

However, another method did work. The hack that did work was unsophisticated enough that many high school students would be able to achieve it. This hack altered the election by 100,000 votes, leaving no trace at all in the central tabulator program. It did not appear in any audit log. The hack could have been executed in the November 2004 election by just one person.

This hack stunned the officials who were observing the test. It calls into question the results of as many as 40 million votes in 30 states. We are awaiting the response of the House Judiciary Committee to this new development for their investigation.

In another real-world example, Black Box Voting obtained the actual files used in the Nov. 2 election in a specific county. In this situation, the local officials did not know how to run their Diebold system, so a Diebold tech ran the election in that county. Election officials remembered the Diebold tech's first name, but not his last name.

The Diebold tech had gone home after the election, and no one in the county was able to access their own voting system, leading to some consternation because they could not provide our public records request.

Because local officials could not access their logs, we were given permission to sit down and copy files. (We have since found that this is not an isolated problem -- many local officials are painfully unfamiliar with their own voting systems.)

Local officials did not know their password, so Bev Harris asked if they would like her to hack the password. They said "yes" (!)

Later, to our even greater surprise, Bev Harris found that the password set by the Diebold tech on this real election file, used in the Nov. 2004 election was ... drum roll please ... the diabolically clever password: "diebold." (This took only two tries to guess.)

The significance of these two reports is this: By hacking into the central tabulator so easily, we showed that Diebold has not told the truth about the security of its system. Indeed, the software being used in BOTH examples is still extremely vulnerable, with little or no effort made to correct its security flaws.

We have offered to meet with public officials at several different levels to provide more documentation on these problems.

We must have a complete revamp of our voting system and toss out private contractors with deeeep ties to political groups (ChoicePoint, Diebold, ES&S)
 

Votingisanillusion

Senior member
Nov 6, 2004
626
0
0
More scientific analysis! But who cares about a scientific approach? Blind faith in the secret software used to count the vote is so much more simple.

http://bellaciao.org/en/article.php3?id_article=5637

Thursday 31st March 2005 (17h00) :
Scientific Analysis Suggests US Presidential Vote Counts May Have Been Altered
8 comment(s).
Scientific Analysis Suggests Presidential Vote Counts May Have Been Altered Group of University Professors Urges Investigation of 2004 Election

http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/Exit_Polls_2004_Edison-Mitofsky.pdf US Count Votes March 31st , 2005

Officially, President Bush won November?s election by 2.5%, yet exit polls showed Kerry winning by 3% [1] . According to a report to be released today by a group of university statisticians, the odds of a discrepancy this large between the national exit poll and election results happening by accident are close to 1 in a million.

In other words, by random chance alone, it could not have happened. But it did.

Two alternatives remain. Either something was wrong with the exit polling, or something was wrong with the vote count.

Exit polls have been used to verify the integrity of elections in the Ukraine, in Latin America, in Germany, and elsewhere. Yet in November 2004, the U.S. exit poll discrepancy was much more than normal exit poll error (and similar to that of the invalid Ukraine election.[2] )

In a recent survey of US members of the world?s oldest and largest computer society, The Association for Computing Machinery, 95% opposed software driven un-auditable voting machines [3] , of the type that now count at least 30% of U.S. votes. Today?s electronic vote-counting machines are not required to include basic safeguards that would prevent and detect machine or human caused errors, be they innocent or deliberate. [4]

The consortium that conducted the presidential exit polls, Edison/Mitofsky, issued a report in January suggesting that the discrepancy between election results and exit polls occurred because Bush voters were more reticent than Kerry voters in response to pollsters.

The authors of this newly released scientific study "Analysis of the 2004 Presidential Election Poll Discrepancies" consider this "reluctant Bush responder" hypothesis to be highly implausible, based on extensive analysis of Edison/Mitofsky?s exit poll data. They conclude, /?The required pattern of exit poll participation by Kerry and Bush voters to satisfy the exit poll data defies empirical experience and common sense under any assumed scenario.?/

A state-by-state analysis of the discrepancy between exit polls and official election results shows highly improbable skewing of the election results, overwhelmingly biased towards the President.

The report concludes, ? We believe that the absence of any statistically-plausible explanation for the discrepancy between Edison/Mitofsky?s exit poll data and the official presidential vote tally is an unanswered question of vital national importance that needs thorough investigation.?

Ph.D. statisticians in America who have seen this group?s preliminary exit poll study have not refuted it. This new study is a much more comprehensive an analysis of the exit poll discrepancies.

The report is available on-line:

http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/Exit_Polls_2004_Edison-Mitofsky.pdf

An executive summary of the report by is available at:

http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/Exit_Polls_summary.pdf

*Contributors and Supporters of the Report include:*

*Josh Mitteldorf*, PhD - Temple University Statistics Department

*Steven F. Freeman*, PhD - Center for Organizational Dynamics, University of Pennsylvania

*Brian Joiner*, PhD - Prof. of Statistics (ret) University of Wisconsin

*Frank Stenger*, PhD - Professor, School of Computing, University of Utah

*Richard G. Sheehan*, PhD -Professor, Department of Finance, University of Notre Dame

*Paul F. Velleman*, PhD - Associate Prof., Department of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University

*Victoria Lovegren*, PhD - Department of Mathematics, Case Western Reserve University

*Campbell** B. Read*, PhD - Prof. Emeritus, Department of Statistical Science, Southern Methodist University

*Jonathan Simon*, J.D., National Ballot Integrity Project

*Ron Baiman, *PhD* *- Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois at Chicago
 

Votingisanillusion

Senior member
Nov 6, 2004
626
0
0
Hum! Hum! Diebold in the news again, thanks to W.
The word of the day: reciprocity. W may not know how to spell it...

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?read=71003

LOOK *WHO* IS PLANNED FOR NEXT US-AMBASSADOR IN GERMANY

Posted By: FarSight3 <Send E-Mail>
Date: Sunday, 8 May 2005, 4:12 a.m.

In Response To: A MESSAGE from the GERMAN AMBASSADOR- * GET OVER IT !** (APHRODITE)

Not much reported in U.S.-MSM-Medea - William R. Timken is planned to be sent to Germany as the new U.S.-ambassador - as was mentioned by White-House-spokesman Robert A. Wood this Saturday.

Why does this create astonishment around Germany? - Mainly - because Timken - can't speak German at all. As Woods stated - this seems to be no "problem" at all - as predecessor Daniel Coats didn't have "diplomatic education" and German language skills as well...

William R. Timken (67) was till 2003 CO of the company in Canton/Ohio bearing his name - producing parts for the aviation,- car- and rail-industries - makers of engineered bearings and alloy steel products - and is now sitting at the board of directors. (http://money.iwon.com/jsp/nw/nwdt_rt.js...ate=20050419&alias=/alias/money/cm/nw)

Moreover Timken sits at the board of directors of Diebold Industries (http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/050428/clth088.html?.v=1) and has donated large amounts for the Republican Party as was reported in Germany's last edition of the weekly DER SPIEGEL.

Ambassadors of "Payback"?

War on Error, Part 181818: "Cobolds of Diebold"
Far Sight 3

__________________________________

http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/050428/clth088.html?.v=1

Press Release Source: Diebold, Incorporated

Diebold Re-Elects Board Members, Declares Cash Dividend
Thursday April 28, 2:12 pm ET

NORTH CANTON, Ohio, April 28 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- Shareholders of Diebold, Incorporated (NYSE: DBD - News) today re-elected the board of directors at the company's annual meeting. In addition, the board declared the second- quarter cash dividend and re-elected company officers.

DIRECTORS RE-ELECTED
Re-elected to the board of directors were:
- Louis V. Bockius III, retired chairman, Bocko Incorporated, North
Canton.
- Christopher M. Connor, chairman and chief executive officer, The
Sherwin-Williams Company, Cleveland.
- Richard L. Crandall, managing director, Aspen Partners, LLC, Aspen,
Colo.
- Eric C. Evans, president and chief operating officer, Diebold,
Incorporated, North Canton.
- Gale S. Fitzgerald, director, TranSpend, Inc., Miami.
- Phillip B. Lassiter, non-executive chairman of the board, Ambac
Financial Group, Inc., New York.
- John N. Lauer, retired chairman of the board, Oglebay Norton Co.,
Cleveland.
- William F. Massy, president, The Jackson Hole Higher Education Group,
Inc., Jackson Hole, Wyo.
- Walden W. O'Dell, chairman and chief executive officer, Diebold,
Incorporated, North Canton.
- Eric J. Roorda, former chairman, Procomp Amazonia Industria Eletronica,
S.A., Sao Paulo, Brazil.
- W.R. Timken, Jr., non-executive chairman of the board, The Timken
Company, Canton, Ohio.

- Henry D.G. Wallace, former group vice president and chief financial
officer, Ford Motor Company, Detroit.
 

conjur

No Lifer
Jun 7, 2001
58,686
3
0
http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/5921.html
Posted on Friday, May 27, 2005 - 05:03 pm:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tallahassee, FL: "Are we having fun yet?"

This is the message that appeared in the window of a county optical scan machine, startling Leon County Information Systems Officer Thomas James. Visibly shaken, he immediately turned the machine off.

Diebold's opti-scan (paper ballot) voting system uses a curious memory card design, offering penetration by a lone programmer such that standard canvassing procedures cannot detect election manipulation.

The Diebold optical scan system was used in about 800 jurisdictions in 2004. Among them were several hotbeds of controversy: Volusia County (FL); King County (WA); and the New Hampshire primary election, where machine results differed markedly from hand-counted localities.

New regs: Counting paper ballots forbidden

Most states prohibit elections officials from checking on optical scan tallies by examining the paper ballots. In Washington, Secretary of State Sam Reed declared such spontaneous checkups to be "unauthorized recounts" and prohibited them altogether. New Florida regulations will forbid counting paper ballots, even in recounts, except in highly unusual circumstances. Without paper ballot hand-counts, the hacks demonstrated below show that optical-scan elections can be destroyed in seconds.

A little man living in every ballot box

The Diebold optical scan system uses a dangerous programming methodology, with an executable program living inside the electronic ballot box. This method is the equivalent of having a little man living in the ballot box, holding an eraser and a pencil. With an executable program in the memory card, no Diebold opti-scan ballot box can be considered "empty" at the start of the election.

The Black Box Voting team proved that the Diebold optical scan program, housed on a chip inside the voting machine, places a call to a program living in the removable memory card during the election. The demonstration also showed that the executable program on the memory card (ballot box) can easily be changed, and that checks and balances, required by FEC standards to catch unauthorized changes, were not implemented by Diebold -- yet the system was certified anyway.

The Diebold system in Leon County, Florida succumbed to multiple attacks.

Ion Sancho: Truth and Excellence in Elections

Leon County Elections Supervisor Ion Sancho and Information Systems Officer Thomas James had already implemented security procedures in Leon County far exceeding the norm in elections management. This testing, done by a team of researchers including Black Box Voting, independent filmmakers, security expert Dr. Herbert Thompson, and special consultant Harri Hursti, was authorized by Mr. Sancho, in an unusual act of openness and courage, to identify any remaining holes in Leon County's election security.

The results of the memory card hack demonstration will assist elections supervisors throughout the U.S., by emphasizing the critical importance of accounting for each and every memory card and protecting access.

Findings:

Computer expert Harri Hursti gained control over Leon County memory cards, which handle the vote-reporting from the precincts. Dr. Herbert Thompson, a security expert, took control of the Leon County central tabulator by implanting a trojan horse-like script.

Two programmers can become a lone programmer, says Hursti, who has figured out a way to control the entire central tabulator by way of a single memory card swap, and also how to make tampered polling place tapes match tampered central tabulator results. This more complex approach is untested, but based on testing performed May 26, Hursti says he has absolutely no reason to believe it wouldn't work.

Three memory card tests demonstrated successful manipulation of election results, and showed that 1990 and 2002 FEC-required safeguards are being violated in the Diebold version 1.94 opti-scan system.

Three memory card hacks

1. An altered memory card (electronic ballot box) was substituted for a real one. The optical scan machine performed seamlessly, issuing a report that looked like the real thing. No checksum captured the change in the executable program Diebold designed into the memory card.

2. A second altered memory card was demonstrated, using a program that was shorter than the original. It still worked, showing that there is also no check for the number of bytes in the program.

3. A third altered memory card was demonstrated with the votes themselves changed, showing that the data block (votes) can be altered without triggering any error message.

How to "Roll over the odometer" in Diebold optical scan machines

Integer overflow checks do not seem to exist in this system, making it possible to stuff the ballot box without triggering any error message. This would be like pre-loading minus 100 votes for Tom and plus 100 votes for Rick (-100+100=ZERO) -- changing the candidate totals without changing the overall number of votes.

A more precise comparison would be this: The odometer on a car rolls over to zero after 999,999. In the Diebold system tested, the rollover to zero happens at 65,536 votes. By pre-loading 65,511 votes for a candidate, after 25 real votes appear (65,511 plus 25 = 65,536) the report "rolls over" so that the candidate's total is ZERO.

This manipulation can be balanced out by preloading votes for candidate "A" at 65,511 and candidate "B" at 25 votes -- producing an articifial 50-vote spread between the candidates, which will not be obvious after the first 25 votes for candidate "A" roll over to zero. The "negative 25" votes from the odometer rollover counterbalance the "plus 25" votes for the other candidates, making the total number of votes cast at the end of the day exactly equal to the number of voters.

While testing the hack on the Leon County optical scan machine, Hursti was stunned to find that pre-stuffing the ballot box to "roll over the odometer" produced no error message whatsoever.*

*We did not have the opportunity to scan ballots after stuffing the ballot box. Therefore, the rollover to zero was not tested in Leon County. This integer overflow capability is discernable in the program itself. We did have the opportunity to test a pre-stuffed ballot box, which showed that pre-loaded ballot boxes do not trigger any error message.

Simple tweaks to pass L&A test and survive zero tape

Though the additional tweaks were not demonstrated at the Leon County elections office, Hursti believes that the integer overflow hack can be covered up on the "zero tape" produced at the beginning of the election. The programming to cover up manipulations during the "logic & accuracy test" is even simpler, since the program allows you to specify on which reports (and, if you like, date and time of day) the manipulation will affect.

The testing demonstrated, using the actual voting system used in a real elections office, that Diebold programmers developed a system that sacrifices security in favor of dangerously flexible programming, violating FEC standards and calling the actions of ITA testing labs and certifiers into question.

In the case of Leon County, inside access was used to achieve the hacks, but there are numerous ways to introduce the hacks without inside access. Outside access methods will be described in the technical report to be released in mid-June.

Security concerns

Putting an executable program into removable memory card "ballot boxes" -- and then programming the opti-scan chip to call and invoke whatever program is in the live ballot box during the middle of an election -- is a mind-boggling design from a security standpoint. Combining this idiotic design with a program that doesn't even check to see whether someone has tampered with it constitutes negligence and should result in a product recall.

Counties that purchased the Diebold 1.94 optical scan machines should not pay for any upgraded program; instead, Diebold should be required to recall the faulty program and correct the problem at its own expense.

None of the attacks left any telltale marks, rendering all audits and logs useless, except for hand-counting all the paper ballots.

Is it real? Or is it Memorex?

For example, Election Supervisor Ion Sancho was unable to tell, at first, whether the poll tape printed with manipulated results was the real thing. Only the message at the end of the tape, which read "Is this real? Or is it Memorex?" identified the tape as a tampered version of results.

In another test, Congresswoman Corrine Brown (FL-Dem) was shocked to see the impact of a trojan implanted by Dr. Herbert Thompson. She asked if the program could be manipulated in such a way as to flip every fifth vote.

"No problem," Dr. Thompson replied.

"It IS a problem. It's a PROBLEM!" exclaimed Brown, whose district includes the troubled Volusia County, along with Duval County -- both currently using the Diebold opti-scan system.

This system is also used in Congressman John Conyers' home district, in contentious King County, Washington, and in Lucas County, Ohio (where six election officials resigned or were suspended after many irregularities were found.)

Diebold optical scans were used in San Diego for its ill-fated mayoral election in Nov. 2004.

- - - - - - - - - - -

Optical scan systems have paper ballots, but election officials are crippled in their ability to hand count these ballots due to restrictive state regulations and budget limitations.

The canvassing (audit) procedure used to certify results from optical scan systems involves comparing the "poll tapes" (cash register-like results receipts) with the printout from the central tabulator. These tests demonstrate that both results can be manipulated easily and quickly.

Minimum requirements to perform this hack:

1. A single specimen memory card from any county using the Diebold 1.94 optical scan series. (These cards were seen scattered on tables in King County, piled in baskets accessible to the public in Georgia, and jumbled on desktops in Volusia county.)

2. A copy of the compiler for the AccuBasic program. (These compilers have been fairly widely distributed by Diebold and its predecessor company, and there are workarounds if no compiler is available.)

3. Modest working language of any one of the higher level computer languages (Pascal, C, Cobol, Basic, Fortran...) along with introductory-level knowledge of assembler or machine language. (Machine language knowledge needed is less than an advanced refrigerator or TV repairmen needs. The optical scan system is much simpler than modern appliances).

The existence of the executable program in the memory card was discernable from a review of the Diebold memos. The test hacks took just a few hours for Black Box Voting consultants to develop.

Nearly 800 jurisdictions conducted a presidential election on this system. This system is so profoundly hackable that an advanced-level TV repairman can manipulate votes on it.

Black Box Voting asked Dr. Thompson and Hursti to examine the central tabulator and the optical scan system after becoming concerned that not enough attention had been paid to optical scans, tabulators and remote access.

Thompson and Hursti each found the vulnerabilities for their respective hacks in less than 24 hours.

"Open for Business"

When it comes to this optical-scan system, as Hursti says, "It's not that they left the door open. There is no door. This system is 'open for business.'"

The question now is: How brisk has business been? Based on this new evidence, it is time to sequester and examine the memory cards used with Diebold optical scans in Nov. 2004.

The popularity of tamper-friendly machines that are "open for business" in heavily Democratic areas may explain the lethargy with which Democratic leaders have been approaching voting machine security concerns.

The enthusiasm with which Republicans have endorsed machines with no paper ballots at all indicates that neither party really wants to have intact auditing of elections.

The ease with which a system -- which clearly violates dozens of FEC standards going back to 1990 -- was certified calls into question the honesty, competence, and personal financial transactions of both testing labs and NASED certifiers.

Revamp and update hand-counted paper ballot technology?

Perhaps it is time to revisit the idea of hand-counted paper ballots, printed by machines for legibility, with color-coded choices for quick, easy, accurate sorting and counting. We should also take another look at bringing counting teams in when the polls close, to relieve tired poll workers.

This report is the "non-techie" version of a longer report, to be made available around mid-June, with more technical information.

PERMISSION TO REPRINT GRANTED AS LONG AS YOU PROVIDE A LINK TO http://www.blackboxvoting.org
Pretty scary stuff.

And people say our election process doesn't need fixing. :roll:
 

Genx87

Lifer
Apr 8, 2002
41,095
513
126
Originally posted by: conjur
Are you going to comment on the TOPIC or just continue trolling?

Bringing up a thread from November is the definition of trolling.

You lost, get over it.
 

conjur

No Lifer
Jun 7, 2001
58,686
3
0
It was less than a month ago this was last updated.

Now, again, are you going to discuss the TOPIC or continue trolling?
 

Genx87

Lifer
Apr 8, 2002
41,095
513
126
Originally posted by: conjur
It was less than a month ago this was last updated.

Now, again, are you going to discuss the TOPIC or continue trolling?

Oh how nice, less than a month ago.

Whoopie do

Get over it.



 

conjur

No Lifer
Jun 7, 2001
58,686
3
0
Just as I thought. More trolling.


Now, back to the last update I posted:

http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/5921.html
Posted on Friday, May 27, 2005 - 05:03 pm:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tallahassee, FL: "Are we having fun yet?"

This is the message that appeared in the window of a county optical scan machine, startling Leon County Information Systems Officer Thomas James. Visibly shaken, he immediately turned the machine off.

Diebold's opti-scan (paper ballot) voting system uses a curious memory card design, offering penetration by a lone programmer such that standard canvassing procedures cannot detect election manipulation.

The Diebold optical scan system was used in about 800 jurisdictions in 2004. Among them were several hotbeds of controversy: Volusia County (FL); King County (WA); and the New Hampshire primary election, where machine results differed markedly from hand-counted localities.

New regs: Counting paper ballots forbidden

Most states prohibit elections officials from checking on optical scan tallies by examining the paper ballots. In Washington, Secretary of State Sam Reed declared such spontaneous checkups to be "unauthorized recounts" and prohibited them altogether. New Florida regulations will forbid counting paper ballots, even in recounts, except in highly unusual circumstances. Without paper ballot hand-counts, the hacks demonstrated below show that optical-scan elections can be destroyed in seconds.

A little man living in every ballot box

The Diebold optical scan system uses a dangerous programming methodology, with an executable program living inside the electronic ballot box. This method is the equivalent of having a little man living in the ballot box, holding an eraser and a pencil. With an executable program in the memory card, no Diebold opti-scan ballot box can be considered "empty" at the start of the election.

The Black Box Voting team proved that the Diebold optical scan program, housed on a chip inside the voting machine, places a call to a program living in the removable memory card during the election. The demonstration also showed that the executable program on the memory card (ballot box) can easily be changed, and that checks and balances, required by FEC standards to catch unauthorized changes, were not implemented by Diebold -- yet the system was certified anyway.

The Diebold system in Leon County, Florida succumbed to multiple attacks.

Ion Sancho: Truth and Excellence in Elections

Leon County Elections Supervisor Ion Sancho and Information Systems Officer Thomas James had already implemented security procedures in Leon County far exceeding the norm in elections management. This testing, done by a team of researchers including Black Box Voting, independent filmmakers, security expert Dr. Herbert Thompson, and special consultant Harri Hursti, was authorized by Mr. Sancho, in an unusual act of openness and courage, to identify any remaining holes in Leon County's election security.

The results of the memory card hack demonstration will assist elections supervisors throughout the U.S., by emphasizing the critical importance of accounting for each and every memory card and protecting access.

Findings:

Computer expert Harri Hursti gained control over Leon County memory cards, which handle the vote-reporting from the precincts. Dr. Herbert Thompson, a security expert, took control of the Leon County central tabulator by implanting a trojan horse-like script.

Two programmers can become a lone programmer, says Hursti, who has figured out a way to control the entire central tabulator by way of a single memory card swap, and also how to make tampered polling place tapes match tampered central tabulator results. This more complex approach is untested, but based on testing performed May 26, Hursti says he has absolutely no reason to believe it wouldn't work.

Three memory card tests demonstrated successful manipulation of election results, and showed that 1990 and 2002 FEC-required safeguards are being violated in the Diebold version 1.94 opti-scan system.

Three memory card hacks

1. An altered memory card (electronic ballot box) was substituted for a real one. The optical scan machine performed seamlessly, issuing a report that looked like the real thing. No checksum captured the change in the executable program Diebold designed into the memory card.

2. A second altered memory card was demonstrated, using a program that was shorter than the original. It still worked, showing that there is also no check for the number of bytes in the program.

3. A third altered memory card was demonstrated with the votes themselves changed, showing that the data block (votes) can be altered without triggering any error message.

How to "Roll over the odometer" in Diebold optical scan machines

Integer overflow checks do not seem to exist in this system, making it possible to stuff the ballot box without triggering any error message. This would be like pre-loading minus 100 votes for Tom and plus 100 votes for Rick (-100+100=ZERO) -- changing the candidate totals without changing the overall number of votes.

A more precise comparison would be this: The odometer on a car rolls over to zero after 999,999. In the Diebold system tested, the rollover to zero happens at 65,536 votes. By pre-loading 65,511 votes for a candidate, after 25 real votes appear (65,511 plus 25 = 65,536) the report "rolls over" so that the candidate's total is ZERO.

This manipulation can be balanced out by preloading votes for candidate "A" at 65,511 and candidate "B" at 25 votes -- producing an articifial 50-vote spread between the candidates, which will not be obvious after the first 25 votes for candidate "A" roll over to zero. The "negative 25" votes from the odometer rollover counterbalance the "plus 25" votes for the other candidates, making the total number of votes cast at the end of the day exactly equal to the number of voters.

While testing the hack on the Leon County optical scan machine, Hursti was stunned to find that pre-stuffing the ballot box to "roll over the odometer" produced no error message whatsoever.*

*We did not have the opportunity to scan ballots after stuffing the ballot box. Therefore, the rollover to zero was not tested in Leon County. This integer overflow capability is discernable in the program itself. We did have the opportunity to test a pre-stuffed ballot box, which showed that pre-loaded ballot boxes do not trigger any error message.

Simple tweaks to pass L&A test and survive zero tape

Though the additional tweaks were not demonstrated at the Leon County elections office, Hursti believes that the integer overflow hack can be covered up on the "zero tape" produced at the beginning of the election. The programming to cover up manipulations during the "logic & accuracy test" is even simpler, since the program allows you to specify on which reports (and, if you like, date and time of day) the manipulation will affect.

The testing demonstrated, using the actual voting system used in a real elections office, that Diebold programmers developed a system that sacrifices security in favor of dangerously flexible programming, violating FEC standards and calling the actions of ITA testing labs and certifiers into question.

In the case of Leon County, inside access was used to achieve the hacks, but there are numerous ways to introduce the hacks without inside access. Outside access methods will be described in the technical report to be released in mid-June.

Security concerns

Putting an executable program into removable memory card "ballot boxes" -- and then programming the opti-scan chip to call and invoke whatever program is in the live ballot box during the middle of an election -- is a mind-boggling design from a security standpoint. Combining this idiotic design with a program that doesn't even check to see whether someone has tampered with it constitutes negligence and should result in a product recall.

Counties that purchased the Diebold 1.94 optical scan machines should not pay for any upgraded program; instead, Diebold should be required to recall the faulty program and correct the problem at its own expense.

None of the attacks left any telltale marks, rendering all audits and logs useless, except for hand-counting all the paper ballots.

Is it real? Or is it Memorex?

For example, Election Supervisor Ion Sancho was unable to tell, at first, whether the poll tape printed with manipulated results was the real thing. Only the message at the end of the tape, which read "Is this real? Or is it Memorex?" identified the tape as a tampered version of results.

In another test, Congresswoman Corrine Brown (FL-Dem) was shocked to see the impact of a trojan implanted by Dr. Herbert Thompson. She asked if the program could be manipulated in such a way as to flip every fifth vote.

"No problem," Dr. Thompson replied.

"It IS a problem. It's a PROBLEM!" exclaimed Brown, whose district includes the troubled Volusia County, along with Duval County -- both currently using the Diebold opti-scan system.

This system is also used in Congressman John Conyers' home district, in contentious King County, Washington, and in Lucas County, Ohio (where six election officials resigned or were suspended after many irregularities were found.)

Diebold optical scans were used in San Diego for its ill-fated mayoral election in Nov. 2004.

- - - - - - - - - - -

Optical scan systems have paper ballots, but election officials are crippled in their ability to hand count these ballots due to restrictive state regulations and budget limitations.

The canvassing (audit) procedure used to certify results from optical scan systems involves comparing the "poll tapes" (cash register-like results receipts) with the printout from the central tabulator. These tests demonstrate that both results can be manipulated easily and quickly.

Minimum requirements to perform this hack:

1. A single specimen memory card from any county using the Diebold 1.94 optical scan series. (These cards were seen scattered on tables in King County, piled in baskets accessible to the public in Georgia, and jumbled on desktops in Volusia county.)

2. A copy of the compiler for the AccuBasic program. (These compilers have been fairly widely distributed by Diebold and its predecessor company, and there are workarounds if no compiler is available.)

3. Modest working language of any one of the higher level computer languages (Pascal, C, Cobol, Basic, Fortran...) along with introductory-level knowledge of assembler or machine language. (Machine language knowledge needed is less than an advanced refrigerator or TV repairmen needs. The optical scan system is much simpler than modern appliances).

The existence of the executable program in the memory card was discernable from a review of the Diebold memos. The test hacks took just a few hours for Black Box Voting consultants to develop.

Nearly 800 jurisdictions conducted a presidential election on this system. This system is so profoundly hackable that an advanced-level TV repairman can manipulate votes on it.

Black Box Voting asked Dr. Thompson and Hursti to examine the central tabulator and the optical scan system after becoming concerned that not enough attention had been paid to optical scans, tabulators and remote access.

Thompson and Hursti each found the vulnerabilities for their respective hacks in less than 24 hours.

"Open for Business"

When it comes to this optical-scan system, as Hursti says, "It's not that they left the door open. There is no door. This system is 'open for business.'"

The question now is: How brisk has business been? Based on this new evidence, it is time to sequester and examine the memory cards used with Diebold optical scans in Nov. 2004.

The popularity of tamper-friendly machines that are "open for business" in heavily Democratic areas may explain the lethargy with which Democratic leaders have been approaching voting machine security concerns.

The enthusiasm with which Republicans have endorsed machines with no paper ballots at all indicates that neither party really wants to have intact auditing of elections.

The ease with which a system -- which clearly violates dozens of FEC standards going back to 1990 -- was certified calls into question the honesty, competence, and personal financial transactions of both testing labs and NASED certifiers.

Revamp and update hand-counted paper ballot technology?

Perhaps it is time to revisit the idea of hand-counted paper ballots, printed by machines for legibility, with color-coded choices for quick, easy, accurate sorting and counting. We should also take another look at bringing counting teams in when the polls close, to relieve tired poll workers.

This report is the "non-techie" version of a longer report, to be made available around mid-June, with more technical information.

PERMISSION TO REPRINT GRANTED AS LONG AS YOU PROVIDE A LINK TO http://www.blackboxvoting.org
Pretty scary stuff.

And people say our election process doesn't need fixing. :roll:
 
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