- Mar 17, 2008
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That could very well be, but there are too many separate and distinct machines, locations, systems, rules and regulations, and possible actions for me to even guess how much the disruption would be. Hopefully, now that we are on notice of the attacks, things will be more difficult for them in the future. However I am sure that there will be some locations that fail to harden against attacks that will allow folks with bad intentions to come right on in.
Thats why they target likely swing states and infiltrate those specific procedures.
I think you misunderstand. Voter data is a big subject. Even with paper trails intruders can wreak havoc on the process. If the systems at the precinct level rely on remote servers, they can make that information unavailable. They can issue contradictory instructions, screw up the voter rolls, mis-allocate resources & all sorts of tricks we haven't imagined. It's hard to do that much because it's mostly decentralized & every locality has its own ballot.
They don't have to change any votes to discredit the voting process. A few colossal clusterfucks would do the job, I figure.
- Yea I get that, its all about them sum of the game in the end.
Been reading up on it tonight, apparently the sop is to have the actual ballot boxes not-networked (and yet again, some are, even with remote access software installed in case a technician needs to log in and fix a problem!!!).. So the actual machines are updated with the current ballot software and candidates ... via usb stick or memory card. It goes to reason that to get the actual cast votes, one would have to transfer it to USB stick again, and then transport back to election-hq and the main election software there - and THIS software is usually networked. If someone were to "hack the vote" I guess it would be there. Or via the USB drives going out with the software to begin with.
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