Some thoughts on the conflict in the 47th Brigade
1. The general reason: significant losses in a short time, difficult conditions for breaking through the enemy's echelon defense, the lack of coordination of the brigade in the combat situation, and the lack of combat experience of the majority of servicemen. Here you have to take on your part of the responsibility for the situation, and that is difficult.
2. What I saw personally in April 2022: the acting deputy commander of the brigade, 26-year-old I. Shalamaga, at the beginning of the war, was the company commander of the 30th brigade, to which 29-year-old V. Markus joined voluntarily after the beginning of the invasion as a sergeant, they quickly became friends and worked together. Brigadier General of the 30th O. Zinevych achieved the creation of the 47th battalion, of which he appointed Shalamaga as a commander. That is, in the beginning, Shalamaga recruited the popular Marcus into the battalion, but then Marcus's popularity became one of the important factors why the battalion was decided to deploy into a regiment and a brigade.
3. Whose work is this? The 47th mechanized brigade was created by the decision of the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Zaluzhnyi to break through the enemy's defenses. To implement the project, the Zaluzhns engaged 28-year-old Brigadier General O. Sak - one of the best combatants of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, who was selected with a certain logic for the breakthrough brigade, and who was entrusted with a difficult task. Markus created a fund to help the brigade - it is fair to note that other volunteer funds, including "Come Back Alive", participated in providing for the brigade. At the same time, Markus became not only the chief sergeant, but also the face of the brigade, attracted a significant part of people and carried out the selection, including thanks to a personal communication channel with the leadership of the Armed Forces. Marcus felt his own responsibility for the state of affairs in the brigade, not only as a master sergeant, but also as a public figure.
4. Formally, the time to create a brigade was more than that of other ordinary infantry brigades of the Armed Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian National Army. But on the other hand, this time was not enough to adjust the brigade to perform such a difficult task of the breakthrough that was set. The transfer of a large number of new complex military equipment did not require speeding up, but on the contrary, additional time for its development, repair and practice of tactics. If there was time to gradually bring the brigade into battle to begin with in more stable areas of the front, there would be an opportunity to correct the deficiencies in the combat situation. But there was no time for this.
5. I believe that the insults in Marcus's report about Shalamaga are unacceptable. First, Shalamaga had an impeccable combat record in past positions. Secondly, Shalamaga was publicly and positively evaluated very recently by Marcus himself, so to make such a sharp U-turn one needs to provide arguments. The report should primarily be the basis for decision-making, and the offense shifted the emphasis not on the necessary systemic decisions, but on personal conflicts. Shalamaga's offense looks like an attempt to oppose himself and shift the public responsibility, which was previously borne jointly, to one person.
6. Markus's words about "the lack of will of the brigade command to protect the interests of the military unit before the higher command" refer, obviously, to the order of use of the brigade, which led to significant losses in very difficult conditions. And there are reasons for analyzing the situation, and the question must be raised, and for the death and injury of people, of course, they ask from the one who brought a significant part of the people to the brigade with his statements and interviews. In human terms, this is an understandable reaction to the suffering of fellow human beings. And here there is an obvious allusion to the actions of the corps command, which practices micromanagement. Marcus, as well as Sak and Shalamaga, repeatedly risked themselves during these battles on the front lines. But can the brigade command "have the will to protect the unit from the higher command" if the brigade command must carry out orders to break through with available forces? Wouldn't it be more logical to jointly look for means of influencing the same "higher command" so that there is no need to "defend" against it? Especially if there is an opportunity to convey an opinion to the president and the chairman himself?
7. War is an academy with daily exams, and it is necessary to objectively establish the truth in order to finally begin to learn and draw conclusions from our own experience. If someone were to analyze and report on the scale of problems and errors in the deployment and application of, for example, the 115th mechanized brigade in early 2022, or some other brigades of the reserve corps, TRO brigades, and the cost of these errors, then in the order of application and planning actions of the newly formed brigades in 2023, changes would finally be made, and mistakes would not be repeated. Improvisations where the order of application is necessary lead to scandals, because apart from a scandal, it is impossible to solve systemic problems in our country, even in spite of direct connections with top managers, as we see in this case. I would really like to finally have a post-operational analysis mechanism up and running. So that the state leadership receives data through several channels, where enemy losses and our losses and gains are discussed exclusively on the basis of verified information - video, photo, map, responsible persons... I don't know what other high-profile scandal is needed for awareness that war is a competition of systems and order.