I clearly have over several previous posts - I've providing data that the existing mechanisms are not meaningfully bad to the general US populace and companies. And that it doesn't create a moral hazard. Your response is basically that you don't believe it's the right thing to do but your plan is an empty box. You can't or at least haven't supported your 'solution' by showing that it would be a net benefit for the US and avoids consequences to large groups of people. You say passing along the costs is 'fine' but there are several immediate problems with your idea
I'll just give the first one. Banks will not pass on costs relative to those gaining protections beyond FDIC and regulators will not force them to. Why? Those large depositors (typically companies) would just find alternative means - moving money outside of well understood, regulated areas with above average oversight and insight. Companies will choose to undertake risker and more shadowy activities. You might be tempted to explain that away with a 'this isn't complicated just regulate it more' but there has not been a single time in the history of the US that additional financial regulations have been foolproof and prevented credit\stock\asset crises. Relying on those is choosing to fail in some new and novel way at some point in the future. Our current system has been iterated enough we have the lowest number of bank failures and recessions at any point in the history of the US. You might be tempted to say 'well those companies deserve their fate!'. Except that big institutions can do such risky things they blow up everything for everyone when they do those together and pushing those increased fee costs to all the companies in the US is going to drive a massive flight to these alternative stashes. In addition the huge single depositor also has influence and can be wooed by banks with low fees so banks will also be in tight competition with eachother to lower costs for these marquis customers.
So - where do those costs go? We know from a fairly well established pattern that they will get heaped on those who cost the banks the most - low deposit base individuals. The venn diagram of this group and the poor, minorities and other marginalized groups is substantial. Not only the branches that serve those communities but the service and support available in general as well. One of the unintended consequences of Dodd-Frank was that it ended up being an additional incentive for banking consolidation (it certainly wasn't the only driver but it did play a role). This is one of the biggest reasons Barney wanted to raise the cap. The banking consolidation since 2009 has disproportionally hit low income areas who
already pay
substantially more fees as it is.
Realistically this is as far as I'll go with this: The system works 99.8% of the time and has cost "us" a grand total of -$15Bn in the 15 years leading up to this month. The cost for the current predicament has yet to be totaled and likely won't be for several years. By current appearances (acknowledgements to the chance of changing) adding in this month may make the cost $10Bn total or $660M a year - which is absolutely tiny in comparison to our economy. For that amount of money you want to materially change or set hard limits for an incredibly complex and interconnected system handling trillions of dollars a year leading to a likely array of negative outcomes including further marginalization of already marginalized groups, creation of moral hazards elsewhere, and greater disruption\consequences during a crisis. To attempt what? Get to 100% success? The risk doesn't seem worth it to me. I doubt we will be able to convince eachother