On "Climate Reparations"
The Kyoto Protocol -- which expires in 2012, and which Copenhagen is intended to replace -- was in some corners accused of being a covert wealth-transfer plot, since it required rich nations, unable to reach difficult targets, to buy carbon indulgences from poorer ones. "A socialist scheme to suck money out of wealth-producing nations" was Stephen Harper's assessment, long before he became Prime Minister.
With Copenhagen, however, there is no hidden agenda: Its authors say transferring wealth is exactly what they aim to do. Though its draft form is a menu of optional language and policies intended to be narrowed in the lead-up to the conference, and at the conference itself, the spirit of the document is unmistakable.
It proposes in plain language an arrangement that will see nations such as Canada guarantee to send billions of dollars every year for decades to the developing world as payment of a "climate debt" owed for our long history of emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.
There is, of course, some talk of emission-reduction targets, maximum carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere, limiting global temperature increases, and plans to adapt to inevitable climate shifts, with most of the details remaining to be hammered out. But as much as anything else, the Copenhagen treaty calls for the payment by rich countries of what can probably best be described as climate reparations.
These are some of the understandings proposed in the treaty's current working version: Industrialized countries should compensate developing nations for not just the cost of preventing and adapting to climate change, but for "lost opportunities, resources, lives, land and dignity" triggered by it; industrialized countries are to commit "at least 0.7%" of their annual GDP, above and beyond existing foreign aid commitments, to compensate the developing world for lost dignity and other distress; and that the money will be deliverable to the United Nations, which will be in charge of handing it all out.
"By 2020," the treaty insists "the scale of financial flows to support adaptation in developing countries must be [either] at least US$67-billion [or] in the range of US$70-to US$140-billion" every year. And in the end, because it may only shift carbon-intensive production from cleaner countries to less-efficient ones, the entire exercise may do very little to limit emissions.
On A Loss Of National Sovereignty
Copenhagen entrusts these billions [in climate reparations] to the management of the United Nations. Paragraph 200, Annex 3b, for example, requires signatories to submit to the UN their plans to reduce emissions, which "shall be reviewed as part of the annual compilation and accounting of emission inventories and assigned amount," suggesting that if the UN doesn't like a certain country's plan to cut greenhouse gases (GHGs), it has the power to deny assigned emission allowances until it sees a plan it does -- potentially, he says, leaving countries without full control of their own environmental policy.
On Encouraging Unfair World Trade
It gets trickier: Under the proposed treaty, developing countries -- which would include such Canadian trade competitors as China, South Korea, India, Brazil and Mexico -- are under far looser obligations to reduce emissions than wealthier nations like Canada; they are, after all, generally less equipped to modernize their infrastructure.
But under Copenhagen's paragraph 23, Annex 1, and paragraph 7, Annex 3e, no nation is permitted to impose "any form of unilateral measures including countervailing border measures, against goods and services imported from developing countries on grounds of protection and stabilization of the climate."
So, although China might impose duties on any Canadian steel it imports, if it can show we have fallen short on carbon dioxide reductions, Canada could not do the same to Chinese concrete imports. And while World Trade Organization rules prohibit any foreign government from slapping tariffs on Canadian exports on the excuse that we refused to sign Copenhagen, if we do sign it, and then don't live up to our promises, it could well be legal for our trading partners -- even our NAFTA partners -- to claim that our failure to live up to emission-reduction targets gives us an advantage, permitting them to put barriers up to our goods.