In the mid-2000s,
AMD came to believe that Intel was unfairly out to sabotage it in the marketplace once more, using money and clout to beat back AMD's technological superiority. Ruiz describes the company's view in his book:
Toshiba had accepted a hefty payment from Intel in 2001 on the promise that it wouldn’t use AMD processors. The “market development funds” totaled between $25 million and $30 million per quarter—a sum Toshiba executives likened to “cocaine” because it was a deal they just couldn’t quit.
Intel had bought Hitachi’s exclusivity as well. Whereas AMD had been shipping 50,000 Athlon chips to Hitachi in the first and second quarters of 2002, by the third quarter AMD’s shipments suddenly fell to zero.
NEC’s stance was especially disappointing. By the third quarter of 2002, AMD had won 84 percent of NEC’s Japanese consumer desktop business—a substantial achievement given our historical position as number two in the global semiconductor market. Looking at notebooks and desktops together, we supplied 40 percent of the company’s microprocessor needs. That would end shortly after Intel agreed to pay NEC more than ¥3 billion per quarter, as long as NEC would give 90 percent of its business to Intel and strictly limit its dealings with AMD. By 2003, AMD’s share of NEC’s consumer desktop business had slid to nearly zero too.
NEC went so far as to tell us firsthand about its agreement with Intel, which dictated that AMD’s share of NEC’s Japanese market had to be held to single digits. Globally, AMD’s share of NEC business would fall from 40 percent to 15 percent.
Amid all this activity, it seemed that whenever we took one step forward, we stumbled two steps back. This was particularly frustrating because AMD had become the market leader in technology; we had been expecting advances, so the sudden retreats seemed undeserved. I knew from the start that AMD’s fight for market share was going to be an uphill battle. But I held faith that the market would right itself in time.
AMD had already filed a similar complaint with the European Commission back in 2000, and Japan’s Fair Trade Commission found that Intel violated antitrust rules there.