Things which look like safe assumptions at this point:
1. NK will work on nukes no matter what "agreement" we make on them.
2. With the exception of some isolated incidents (e.g. a few ad hoc kidnapping the citizens of other countries) NK is not externally aggressive and will continue not to be.
3. There is little advantage to the US or rest of world in maintaining the "armistice" status quo that wouldn't also apply to a formal peace deal officially ending the war.
4. NK has basically nothing of value to in trade to us or the rest of the world absent nuke technology or maybe some low-value commodity products.
Therefore throwing off the "well we've been hostile with them since the 1950s" paradigm, I'm not sure a reasonable deal that actually supports our long-term strategic interests wouldn't consist of something like what's in this story. Combined with a formal peace deal it recognizes reality as it is, not as we wish it would be. We acknowledge NK nukes will be produced no matter what, despite if there's a deal. We acknowledge the regime, while a humanitarian disaster to its own people, doesn't represent a huge global security threat as NK isn't attacking SK or anything else directly anytime soon. And we acknowledge the bigger threat is NK giving nukes to others less concerned about self-preservation than they are (insert terrorist group, or bitter ethnic/tribal rivalry group here) so that's what we should be working on stopping.
Of course, Trump is the worst possible POTUS to execute the stuff I just said above.