WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A new U.S. intelligence report says Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and it remains on hold, contradicting the Bush administration's earlier assertion that Tehran was intent on developing a bomb.
The new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released on Monday could hamper U.S. efforts to convince other world powers to agree on a third package of U.N. sanctions against Iran for defying demands to halt uranium enrichment activities.
Iran says it wants nuclear technology only for civilian purposes, such as electricity generation.
Tensions have escalated in recent months as Washington has ratcheted up the rhetoric against Tehran, with U.S. President George W. Bush insisting in October that a nuclear-armed Iran could lead to World War Three.
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
Must be true. US intel is never wrong.
Were there any footnotes in the Iraq NIE?
Yes. Two have come to public attention. In one, the State Department's INR bureau dissented from the intelligence community's majority view that Baghdad was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, saying there was not enough evidence to reach that conclusion. In particular, it raised doubts about whether a large shipment of aluminum tubes sought by Iraq was intended for centrifuges to enrich nuclear fuel, as asserted by other agencies. In another footnote, the U.S. Air Force's director for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance questioned whether the unmanned aerial vehicles being developed by Iraq were "probably" intended to deliver biological agents. Instead, he said that would be an unlikely mission for such aircraft. This footnote was left out of the declassified version.
What did the Senate report say about the Iraq NIE?
It found that the analysts who wrote the NIE relied more on an assumption that Iraq had WMD than on an objective evaluation of the information they were reviewing. This "group think" dynamic, the report states, led analysts, intelligence collectors, and managers to "interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program" and led them to "ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have an active and expanding program." This problem was compounded by a lack of reliable information from inside Iraq. After U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998, the U.S. intelligence community did not have any human intelligence sources in Iraq collecting information about WMD. In addition, the NIE failed to adequately and accurately explain uncertainties about the reliability of some key sources and its final conclusions. As a result, the estimate implied that the WMD evidence was more solid than it really was, the Senate report said.
Did President Bush or other policy-makers pressure the writers of the NIE to reach conclusions that supported the administration's pro-war case?
No, according to the Senate report. Instead, the NIE's flawed conclusions resulted from a variety of factors, including faulty analysis, a lack of information-sharing among intelligence agencies, and poor management, the report states. But some Senate Democrats say there was pressure. John D. Rockefeller (W. Va.), vice chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, said July 9 that while policy-makers did not appear to have directly intervened in the NIE writing process, the NIE was assembled in a general "environment of intense pressure" that encouraged caveat-free assertions about Iraq's WMD. By October 2002, when the NIE was released, "the most senior officials in the Bush administration had already forcefully and repeatedly stated their conclusions [that Iraq had WMD] publicly," Rockefeller said. In August 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney, in a speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention, said, "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction." Bush administration officials say that no political pressure was brought to bear on the NIE writers.
Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad started reconstituting it nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM inspectors departed - December 1998.
......
Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a wepon until 2007 to 2009, owing to inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to produce highly enriched uranium and challengs in procurring the necessary equipment and expertise.
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
Must be true. US intel is never wrong.
So four Democratic members of the SSCI requested the NIE, misinterpreted it, and then voted for the AUMF?Originally posted by: RightIsWrong
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
Must be true. US intel is never wrong.
It wasn't the intel that was wrong. It was the interpretation of the intel.
CFR's take on the 2002 NIE
Were there any footnotes in the Iraq NIE?
Yes. Two have come to public attention. In one, the State Department's INR bureau dissented from the intelligence community's majority view that Baghdad was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, saying there was not enough evidence to reach that conclusion. In particular, it raised doubts about whether a large shipment of aluminum tubes sought by Iraq was intended for centrifuges to enrich nuclear fuel, as asserted by other agencies. In another footnote, the U.S. Air Force's director for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance questioned whether the unmanned aerial vehicles being developed by Iraq were "probably" intended to deliver biological agents. Instead, he said that would be an unlikely mission for such aircraft. This footnote was left out of the declassified version.
What did the Senate report say about the Iraq NIE?
It found that the analysts who wrote the NIE relied more on an assumption that Iraq had WMD than on an objective evaluation of the information they were reviewing. This "group think" dynamic, the report states, led analysts, intelligence collectors, and managers to "interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program" and led them to "ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have an active and expanding program." This problem was compounded by a lack of reliable information from inside Iraq. After U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998, the U.S. intelligence community did not have any human intelligence sources in Iraq collecting information about WMD. In addition, the NIE failed to adequately and accurately explain uncertainties about the reliability of some key sources and its final conclusions. As a result, the estimate implied that the WMD evidence was more solid than it really was, the Senate report said.
Did President Bush or other policy-makers pressure the writers of the NIE to reach conclusions that supported the administration's pro-war case?
No, according to the Senate report. Instead, the NIE's flawed conclusions resulted from a variety of factors, including faulty analysis, a lack of information-sharing among intelligence agencies, and poor management, the report states. But some Senate Democrats say there was pressure. John D. Rockefeller (W. Va.), vice chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, said July 9 that while policy-makers did not appear to have directly intervened in the NIE writing process, the NIE was assembled in a general "environment of intense pressure" that encouraged caveat-free assertions about Iraq's WMD. By October 2002, when the NIE was released, "the most senior officials in the Bush administration had already forcefully and repeatedly stated their conclusions [that Iraq had WMD] publicly," Rockefeller said. In August 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney, in a speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention, said, "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction." Bush administration officials say that no political pressure was brought to bear on the NIE writers.
Edit: Excerpts from the actual declassified version (mostly redacted) of the NIE that can be downloaded from here.
Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad started reconstituting it nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM inspectors departed - December 1998.
......
Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a wepon until 2007 to 2009, owing to inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to produce highly enriched uranium and challengs in procurring the necessary equipment and expertise.
The only "logic" being shown here is the logic of those who seemingly accept an NIE if it tells them what they want to hear but call BS on those that don't.Originally posted by: Atomic Playboy
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
Must be true. US intel is never wrong.
So by this logic, you would never support a war anywhere (short of uniformed soldiers from a foreign nation invading US soil) because our intel may be wrong, correct?
I really, really, really hope Hillary doesn't win the D nomination. I disagree with her on some pretty huge issues...
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
So four Democratic members of the SSCI requested the NIE, misinterpreted it, and then voted for the AUMF?Originally posted by: RightIsWrong
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
Must be true. US intel is never wrong.
It wasn't the intel that was wrong. It was the interpretation of the intel.
CFR's take on the 2002 NIE
Were there any footnotes in the Iraq NIE?
Yes. Two have come to public attention. In one, the State Department's INR bureau dissented from the intelligence community's majority view that Baghdad was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, saying there was not enough evidence to reach that conclusion. In particular, it raised doubts about whether a large shipment of aluminum tubes sought by Iraq was intended for centrifuges to enrich nuclear fuel, as asserted by other agencies. In another footnote, the U.S. Air Force's director for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance questioned whether the unmanned aerial vehicles being developed by Iraq were "probably" intended to deliver biological agents. Instead, he said that would be an unlikely mission for such aircraft. This footnote was left out of the declassified version.
What did the Senate report say about the Iraq NIE?
It found that the analysts who wrote the NIE relied more on an assumption that Iraq had WMD than on an objective evaluation of the information they were reviewing. This "group think" dynamic, the report states, led analysts, intelligence collectors, and managers to "interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusively indicative of a WMD program" and led them to "ignore or minimize evidence that Iraq did not have an active and expanding program." This problem was compounded by a lack of reliable information from inside Iraq. After U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998, the U.S. intelligence community did not have any human intelligence sources in Iraq collecting information about WMD. In addition, the NIE failed to adequately and accurately explain uncertainties about the reliability of some key sources and its final conclusions. As a result, the estimate implied that the WMD evidence was more solid than it really was, the Senate report said.
Did President Bush or other policy-makers pressure the writers of the NIE to reach conclusions that supported the administration's pro-war case?
No, according to the Senate report. Instead, the NIE's flawed conclusions resulted from a variety of factors, including faulty analysis, a lack of information-sharing among intelligence agencies, and poor management, the report states. But some Senate Democrats say there was pressure. John D. Rockefeller (W. Va.), vice chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, said July 9 that while policy-makers did not appear to have directly intervened in the NIE writing process, the NIE was assembled in a general "environment of intense pressure" that encouraged caveat-free assertions about Iraq's WMD. By October 2002, when the NIE was released, "the most senior officials in the Bush administration had already forcefully and repeatedly stated their conclusions [that Iraq had WMD] publicly," Rockefeller said. In August 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney, in a speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention, said, "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction." Bush administration officials say that no political pressure was brought to bear on the NIE writers.
Edit: Excerpts from the actual declassified version (mostly redacted) of the NIE that can be downloaded from here.
Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad started reconstituting it nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM inspectors departed - December 1998.
......
Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a wepon until 2007 to 2009, owing to inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to produce highly enriched uranium and challengs in procurring the necessary equipment and expertise.
OK.
How do we know this NIE on Iran isn't being "misinterpreted" as well?
Try reading what I wrote, and try reading your own link as well. Here is what my reference was to (from your very own link):Originally posted by: RightIsWrong
The SSCI report was AFTER the war in the investigation as to whether the intel was manipulated. Your ASSumption that the Dems were in CYA mode (although in most instances probably valid) in their interpretations of the report that caused the statements above is completely wrong. These statements were made in Sept. 2006
Also, the WH still has not released a full version of the report. If those are what they thought weren't damaging, can you imagine what they took out?
What was the genesis of the Iraq NIE?
According to the July 9 report, it was requested between September 9-17 by four members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence? Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), Bob Graham (D-Fla.), Diane Feinstein (D-Cal.), and Carl Levin (D-Mich.). By the morning of September 12, the NIO for strategic and nuclear programs had received official guidance from the DCI to begin work, according to the Senate report.
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
Try reading what I wrote, and try reading your own link as well. Here is what my reference was to (from your very own link):Originally posted by: RightIsWrong
The SSCI report was AFTER the war in the investigation as to whether the intel was manipulated. Your ASSumption that the Dems were in CYA mode (although in most instances probably valid) in their interpretations of the report that caused the statements above is completely wrong. These statements were made in Sept. 2006
Also, the WH still has not released a full version of the report. If those are what they thought weren't damaging, can you imagine what they took out?
What was the genesis of the Iraq NIE?
According to the July 9 report, it was requested between September 9-17 by four members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence? Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), Bob Graham (D-Fla.), Diane Feinstein (D-Cal.), and Carl Levin (D-Mich.). By the morning of September 12, the NIO for strategic and nuclear programs had received official guidance from the DCI to begin work, according to the Senate report.
So even those four couldn't agree on the interpretation of the NIE along with many other Democrats, some who voted Yea and others who voted Nay?Originally posted by: RightIsWrong
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
Try reading what I wrote, and try reading your own link as well. Here is what my reference was to (from your very own link):Originally posted by: RightIsWrong
The SSCI report was AFTER the war in the investigation as to whether the intel was manipulated. Your ASSumption that the Dems were in CYA mode (although in most instances probably valid) in their interpretations of the report that caused the statements above is completely wrong. These statements were made in Sept. 2006
Also, the WH still has not released a full version of the report. If those are what they thought weren't damaging, can you imagine what they took out?
What was the genesis of the Iraq NIE?
According to the July 9 report, it was requested between September 9-17 by four members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence? Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), Bob Graham (D-Fla.), Diane Feinstein (D-Cal.), and Carl Levin (D-Mich.). By the morning of September 12, the NIO for strategic and nuclear programs had received official guidance from the DCI to begin work, according to the Senate report.
Sorry for missing that. However, it still doesn't change the fact that you were still wrong. Three out of the four voted AGAINST the Iraq bill. Only Feinstein voted "Yea".
Iraq vote roll call
You just weren't completely wrong....just mostly.
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
So even those four couldn't agree on the interpretation of the NIE along with many other Democrats, some who voted Yea and others who voted Nay?
75% voted against it? I counted 28 D's voting Yea. You might want to check your math.Originally posted by: RightIsWrong
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
So even those four couldn't agree on the interpretation of the NIE along with many other Democrats, some who voted Yea and others who voted Nay?
So then, with this much uncertainty....
Should the US have invaded Iraq considering there was no clear cut evidence and such a fragmented opinion about the intelligence?
Remember, if the Dems that saw the NIE are your measuring stick....75% voted AGAINST it.
Stay strong, support our president. Movin' on.Originally posted by: RightIsWrong
What a bunch of commie-loving libruls they have writing the NIE. It's a good thing that our fearless leader isn't afraid to send others into battle over what he knows in his gut instead of listening to those pesky facts.
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
75% voted against it? I counted 28 D's voting Yea. You might want to check your math.Originally posted by: RightIsWrong
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
So even those four couldn't agree on the interpretation of the NIE along with many other Democrats, some who voted Yea and others who voted Nay?
So then, with this much uncertainty....
Should the US have invaded Iraq considering there was no clear cut evidence and such a fragmented opinion about the intelligence?
Remember, if the Dems that saw the NIE are your measuring stick....75% voted AGAINST it.
Besides that you're assuming only the NIE intel was used to determine their vote. I doubt it was that simple.
You're trying to make this about invading Iraq when that's not really the point here. I'm trying to demonstrate that interpreting intel can be hit or miss, and that intel is not always spot on.Originally posted by: RightIsWrong
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
75% voted against it? I counted 28 D's voting Yea. You might want to check your math.Originally posted by: RightIsWrong
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
So even those four couldn't agree on the interpretation of the NIE along with many other Democrats, some who voted Yea and others who voted Nay?
So then, with this much uncertainty....
Should the US have invaded Iraq considering there was no clear cut evidence and such a fragmented opinion about the intelligence?
Remember, if the Dems that saw the NIE are your measuring stick....75% voted AGAINST it.
Besides that you're assuming only the NIE intel was used to determine their vote. I doubt it was that simple.
How many of those 28 that voted Yea actually sit on the SSCI and had access to the NIE? You are right that it wasn't 75% (I only counted the 4 in the article that you were referring to). There were 8 Dems on the committee and it was 50/50 split.
Not really the "slam dunk" that it should have been.
Once again....
Should the US have invaded Iraq considering there was no clear cut evidence and such a fragmented opinion about the intelligence?
And if you think that they based their vote on something other than the NIE or the intelligence at hand....what might that be?
Originally posted by: TastesLikeChicken
You're trying to make this about invading Iraq when that's not really the point here. I'm trying to demonstrate that interpreting intel can be hit or miss, and that intel is not always spot on.
Originally posted by: RightIsWrong
Once again....
Should the US have invaded Iraq considering there was no clear cut evidence and such a fragmented opinion about the intelligence?