Whoa! Ultimate truth found?!

[Paul98]

This highlights my points perfectly. Well done.




We take our consciousness for granted so much that its easy to disregard it and just say "evolution did it" or "its emergent from a complex brain". Both of those statements are probably correct actually, but its still ignoring the mystery.
Consciousness is irreducible in the same way that being pregnant is irreducible: You can't be a little bit pregnant, and you can't be a little bit conscious. You either are, or you are not.
Even the slightest hint of consciousness is enough to present a grand mystery, because dead matter should not be capable of experience of any sort. That is, unless we are missing something, and that something is an explanation to the "hard problem" of consciousness.

Sure a stone is not conscious and a human is. Yet there is a difference between a dog being conscious and a human. The internal perception, thought process, and things like being able to recognize ones self in a mirror.

We have robots and computers that experience parts of the world, learn evolve, and base decisions on those experiences. Of course they are much less complex and an AI and computer processor work in a different way than a brain but would you consider them conscious?

With the building blocks of matter the only difference between something dead and something alive is its arrangement. It comes back to having systems in place to experience something. Such as take sensory input from the outside world and make sense of it in some way, or have the ability for movement even if it's the most basic movement.

 

[Paul98]

I would guess there are two different ways to understand this. One would be to look at evolution and how the most simple consciousness came to be. The other is look at AI's that are built to learn, think, experience, and evolve.

 

[moonbogg]

Sure a stone is not conscious and a human is. Yet there is a difference between a dog being conscious and a human. The internal perception, thought process, and things like being able to recognize ones self in a mirror.

We have robots and computers that experience parts of the world, learn evolve, and base decisions on those experiences. Of course they are much less complex and an AI and computer processor work in a different way than a brain but would you consider them conscious?

With the building blocks of matter the only difference between something dead and something alive is its arrangement. It comes back to having systems in place to experience something. Such as take sensory input from the outside world and make sense of it in some way, or have the ability for movement even if it's the most basic movement.

I still don't feel that you are on the same page with what I'm trying to get at and I'm not sure I can do much more to try to explain it.
You can write a computer program to take sensory input from the outside world and make sense of it in some way. Isn't that how navigational systems work? You mention having "systems in place to experience something". That's kind of like saying, "God did it". It offers no explanation, and that's what people are after when they try to tackle the problem of consciousness.
Clearly there are systems in place to experience something, but that seems to be impossible given what we know about matter and the things it can do, but its a mystery because we know it is possible since we are conscious.
Its so mysterious in fact, that people even disagree on how to frame the question. Its really that bad right now. Everyone is *perfectly* clueless, but as always, some people pretend to have it all figured out and they write new age books on it and make millions, but they are very likely full of crap.
Trying to explain consciousness is hard because it seems to be an immaterial phenomenon, and you can't begin to explain something objectively that isn't material. Its like trying to explain God. You get a million different answers.

 

[Cerpin Taxt]

Sure a stone is not conscious and a human is.

And you know this... how, exactly?

We have robots and computers that experience parts of the world, learn evolve, and base decisions on those experiences.

Do we? You can read robot minds?

With the building blocks of matter the only difference between something dead and something alive is its arrangement.

Then how is one conscious and the other not?

It comes back to having systems in place to experience something. Such as take sensory input from the outside world and make sense of it in some way, or have the ability for movement even if it's the most basic movement.

How does that happen? How to formal systems generate subjective states?

 

[Cerpin Taxt]

I would guess there are two different ways to understand this. One would be to look at evolution and how the most simple consciousness came to be. The other is look at AI's that are built to learn, think, experience, and evolve.

How do you know which consciousness is "the most simple"? What does that even mean?

 

[moonbogg]

I would guess there are two different ways to understand this. One would be to look at evolution and how the most simple consciousness came to be. The other is look at AI's that are built to learn, think, experience, and evolve.

I'll give you an analogy. It may not be a good one but its the best I can do. I actually think its pretty good, but anyway, here it is.

Lets compare consciousness to a mysterious bedroom. The bedroom itself represents consciousness, consisting of 4 walls and a ceiling (you know, a regular room) and the stuff in the room is the contents of consciousness.
The contents of a room could be a chair, a bed and a desk, as well as hundreds of other little things.
The contents of consciousness could be considered the things of your senses, such as sight, smell, sound etc, as well as combinations of those things like going to the movies or playing checkers, both of which are rich experiences within consciousness.
Now, the rooms themselves are mysterious because we can't tell what they are made of or even how they were built. We can see the walls and ceiling, but no matter how hard we try we can't detect what material the walls and ceiling were built from. Its a total mystery why there is a room there at all, let alone figure out what its made of. It just seems to be there.
The contents of the room are easy to explain. The chairs and bed are made of wood, and we can tell how they were made, along with everything else in the room.
Now, regarding your comment about "finding the most simple consciousness" and starting with that, consider the following.
Now, lets say you have two mysterious bedrooms, one is very large filled with lots of stuff, and the other is very, very tiny with absolutely nothing in it. Is it any easier to solve the mystery of the small room? No, its not. You still have the same mystery on your hands because after all, you still have this strange room which begs for an explanation as to how it got there, how its made and what its made of.

Human consciousness is very rich and large, filled with experiences with lots of contents. But even the faintest glow of consciousness from something like an earth worm, however simple, would still present the same degree of difficulty in trying to solve the mystery of how "matter" becomes aware.

 

[Cerpin Taxt]

http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/ka.html

 

[moonbogg]

http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/ka.html

I just clicked the link, but before even reading I must declare, LOOOOL!

Now about the link. I've heard about this argument before and I don't know which side of the fence I fall on (physicalism or any alternative) . Its just too hard for me to say. What I can say is I can see either being reasonable at this point.
This is hurting my brain right now. I need to stop.

 

[PhatoseAlpha]

Meh. The knowledge argument is a clever bit of philosophical sleight of hand, entirely dependent on us completely misunderstanding what Mary must actually know to completely understand color vision in her black and white room.

We imagine spectrums, optics, maybe even some neurology. But in fact, it's far, far greater in scope then that - vision exists in the brain as much as in the eyes, and because of how tightly interconnected the brain is, truly understanding visions means understanding the entirety of a brain. Of course, since everything in the entire universe is connected at the very least by gravity, understanding that brain means understanding the entire universe.

It's a well hidden trick, but ultimately a hollow one that depends on selling us a mental image of a color blind girl while describing a god.

Very similar in character to Searle's Chinese Room though experiment - provocative, but dependent on the person reading misunderstanding the premises and thus imagining a system that is several orders of magnitude too simple.

 

[moonbogg]

Meh. The knowledge argument is a clever bit of philosophical sleight of hand, entirely dependent on us completely misunderstanding what Mary must actually know to completely understand color vision in her black and white room.

We imagine spectrums, optics, maybe even some neurology. But in fact, it's far, far greater in scope then that - vision exists in the brain as much as in the eyes, and because of how tightly interconnected the brain is, truly understanding visions means understanding the entirety of a brain. Of course, since everything in the entire universe is connected at the very least by gravity, understanding that brain means understanding the entire universe.

It's a well hidden trick, but ultimately a hollow one that depends on selling us a mental image of a color blind girl while describing a god.

Very similar in character to Searle's Chinese Room though experiment - provocative, but dependent on the person reading misunderstanding the premises and thus imagining a system that is several orders of magnitude too simple.

So, any idea what consciousness is?

 

[Cerpin Taxt]

Meh. The knowledge argument is a clever bit of philosophical sleight of hand, entirely dependent on us completely misunderstanding what Mary must actually know to completely understand color vision in her black and white room.

We imagine spectrums, optics, maybe even some neurology. But in fact, it's far, far greater in scope then that - vision exists in the brain as much as in the eyes, and because of how tightly interconnected the brain is, truly understanding visions means understanding the entirety of a brain. Of course, since everything in the entire universe is connected at the very least by gravity, understanding that brain means understanding the entire universe.

That isn't it at all. The point is to illustrate the reality of subjective facts and their inaccessibilty via objective methods. The point holds just fine even if one were to stipulate that Mary knows the totality of objective facts about the universe. Your objection is a red herring.

 

[SMOGZINN]

That isn't it at all. The point is to illustrate the reality of subjective facts and their inaccessibilty via objective methods. The point holds just fine even if one were to stipulate that Mary knows the totality of objective facts about the universe. Your objection is a red herring.

No, you misunderstand the statement. What it is saying is that if we actually knew the totalitly of objective facts about color then maybe there really would not be anything more for Mary to learn when she actually sees color. We are assuming that there is something subjective to know about color from seeing it that can not be learned objectively, but we don't really know that. It is a intuitive knowledge, but science has shown us again and again how often intuitive knowledge is wrong.

 

[moonbogg]

No, you misunderstand the statement. What it is saying is that if we actually knew the totalitly of objective facts about color then maybe there really would not be anything more for Mary to learn when she actually sees color. We are assuming that there is something subjective to know about color from seeing it that can not be learned objectively, but we don't really know that. It is a intuitive knowledge, but science has shown us again and again how often intuitive knowledge is wrong.

She may gain no new knowledge when seeing, but she will have finally experienced color. Knowing and experiencing are different, aren't they? I'm not getting deep into definitions and all that, just speaking plainly.
I don't think its important how you define knowledge and what counts as knowledge. Does experiencing color count as new knowledge? I say who cares. The point is that experiencing color can only happen subjectively. Its "like something" to see color and you can't get that experience through knowledge. There is nothing to learn. You can experience it though.

 

[SMOGZINN]

She may gain no new knowledge when seeing, but she will have finally experienced color. Knowing and experiencing are different, aren't they? I'm not getting deep into definitions and all that, just speaking plainly.
I don't think its important how you define knowledge and what counts as knowledge. Does experiencing color count as new knowledge? I say who cares. The point is that experiencing color can only happen subjectively. Its "like something" to see color and you can't get that experience through knowledge. There is nothing to learn. You can experience it though.

Once again, you don't know that. You are intuiting it. You think that 'experiencing' something is some how different from 'knowing' something. I claim that at the level we are talking they are not.

 

[moonbogg]

Once again, you don't know that. You are intuiting it. You think that 'experiencing' something is some how different from 'knowing' something. I claim that at the level we are talking they are not.

The only thing "seeing green" and "knowing about how the brain processes green" have in common, is they are both experiences. It is "like something" to see green and it is "like something" to know about green. But you can experience green and not know a thing about neurology, light waves etc. Even a perfectly ignorant baby can experience green, so how can experiencing green and knowing about green be the same?

By the way, don't jump into the black hole of hard solipsism unless that's your way of ending the conversation. Sometimes people will say, "Solve hard solipsism for me, or else nothing you say carries any weight". To people who present such on obstacle in a conversation, all I can say is, "goodbye".

 

[SMOGZINN]

The only thing "seeing green" and "knowing about how the brain processes green" have in common, is they are both experiences.

What evidence do you have of that? How is it different?

It is "like something" to see green and it is "like something" to know about green. But you can experience green and not know a thing about neurology, light waves etc. Even a perfectly ignorant baby can experience green, so how can experiencing green and knowing about green be the same?

Sure there are easier ways to the knowledge of green, but just because I can point to two paths to the same information does not make them different information. If I know everything there is to know about the color green, then I already have the knowledge of the experience of green, even if I have never seen green.
If the phrase 'I know everything there is to know about green' is true, then there must be nothing new to the experience of green. Therefore I have already experienced green.

By the way, don't jump into the black hole of hard solipsism unless that's your way of ending the conversation. Sometimes people will say, "Solve hard solipsism for me, or else nothing you say carries any weight". To people who present such on obstacle in a conversation, all I can say is, "goodbye".

Hard solipsism? I'm going the very opposite. I am stating that we can actually know things outside of our mind. Your argument sounds a lot like solipsism in disguise.

 

[moonbogg]

What evidence do you have of that? How is it different?



Sure there are easier ways to the knowledge of green, but just because I can point to two paths to the same information does not make them different information. If I know everything there is to know about the color green, then I already have the knowledge of the experience of green, even if I have never seen green.
If the phrase 'I know everything there is to know about green' is true, then there must be nothing new to the experience of green. Therefore I have already experienced green.



Hard solipsism? I'm going the very opposite. I am stating that we can actually know things outside of our mind. Your argument sounds a lot like solipsism in disguise.

I think I finally get what you are saying. The information is not different in either case, whether you are seeing or knowing about seeing. I agree with that. The same information can manifest itself in different ways depending on how you access it, arrive at it, use it or whatever.
I am saying something much simpler. I'm saying that the experience of seeing is different than having the knowledge of seeing. Those experiences feel subjectively different. If that sounds wrong to you, I'm certain you know what I am trying to say.
Regarding the bolded statement, I disagree with that in the following way. We both seem to agree that there is nothing new or added to the information about seeing green and maybe no new knowledge is gained by seeing it, but if you saw green for the first time like Mary, then that experience is new but contains no new information.
Its like this: If you play a video game and experience the game, that is a different experience from writing the code or understanding the code of the game, but the information is no different at all. Same information, but very different experiences.
The thing of interest to me is consciousness, because it seems to be the decoder of information to give rise to experiences. I am interested in the experiences themselves and how they occur from information. (The brain actually decodes it, but how experience happens is mysterious and interesting to me)

 

[Cerpin Taxt]

No, you misunderstand the statement. What it is saying is that if we actually knew the totalitly of objective facts about color then maybe there really would not be anything more for Mary to learn when she actually sees color.

There isn't any "maybe." She would learn what it is like to see color. Until she has that experience, she will not know it.

We are assuming that there is something subjective to know about color from seeing it that can not be learned objectively...

The only thing I am assuming is that Mary has subjective experience which is meaningfully comparable to the way I have subjective experience.

...but we don't really know that.

You're right about that. We don't know if Mary has subjective experience at all. She may be a zombie. The fact that we cannot determine the truth of the proposition "Mary has subjective experience" via objective methods is quite the point of the argument.

It is a intuitive knowledge, but science has shown us again and again how often intuitive knowledge is wrong.

I do not agree that it is intuitive knowledge. In fact, there exist rigorous logical arguments which demonstrate that at least one of these two things must be true: human consciousness cannot be completely described by a formal system, or human mathematical reasoning is fundamentally unsound.

To put it another way, if there existed a formal algorithm underlying human mathematical understanding, we could not discover it objectively because even if we were to stumble upon it by accident, we could not validate it's integrity.

Certainly, that isn't the same as proof that no such algorithm exists, but I can't prove that no gods exist, either. Doesn't stop me from being an atheist, and it doesn't stop me from justifiably withholding belief in such an algorithm.

 

[Cerpin Taxt]

Sure there are easier ways to the knowledge of green, but just because I can point to two paths to the same information does not make them different information. If I know everything there is to know about the color green, then I already have the knowledge of the experience of green, even if I have never seen green.

I don't think you're doing it on purpose, but you're begging the question by erecting a strawman. I'll explain: It isn't stipulated by the argument that Mary knows "everything there is to know about the color green." It is stipulated that Mary knows all the objective facts about the color green. It is then argued that beholding a color via ones own senses commutes new knowledge not included among the totality of objective facts. You are begging the question by supposing that "all the objective facts" is equal to "everything there is to know."

 

[moonbogg]

I don't think you're doing it on purpose, but you're begging the question by erecting a strawman. I'll explain: It isn't stipulated by the argument that Mary knows "everything there is to know about the color green." It is stipulated that Mary knows all the objective facts about the color green. It is then argued that beholding a color via ones own senses commutes new knowledge not included among the totality of objective facts. You are begging the question by supposing that "all the objective facts" is equal to "everything there is to know."

Just to add to this, I find it odd that green doesn't exist in the outside world. Its just a phenomenon that takes place in the brain. If you tried to describe green, could you do it without simply comparing it to other things that are green? It seems like an endless comparison would be the only answer.
"Well, green is what you see when looking at grass, and grass is like looking at a green crayon, and the crayon is like looking at a frog's skin" and so on and so on. Never at any time could someone describe what green is like without simply passing the buck on to something else.

 

[SMOGZINN]

Just to add to this, I find it odd that green doesn't exist in the outside world. Its just a phenomenon that takes place in the brain. If you tried to describe green, could you do it without simply comparing it to other things that are green? It seems like an endless comparison would be the only answer.
"Well, green is what you see when looking at grass, and grass is like looking at a green crayon, and the crayon is like looking at a frog's skin" and so on and so on. Never at any time could someone describe what green is like without simply passing the buck on to something else.

Green is a color on the spectrum of visible light, located between blue and yellow. It is evoked by light with a predominant wavelength of roughly 495–570 nm. In the subtractive color system, used in painting and color printing, it is created by a combination of yellow and blue, or yellow and cyan; in the RGB color model, used on television and computer screens, it is one of the additive primary colors, along with red and blue, which are mixed in different combinations to create all other colors.

 

[moonbogg]

Green is a color on the spectrum of visible light, located between blue and yellow. It is evoked by light with a predominant wavelength of roughly 495–570 nm. In the subtractive color system, used in painting and color printing, it is created by a combination of yellow and blue, or yellow and cyan; in the RGB color model, used on television and computer screens, it is one of the additive primary colors, along with red and blue, which are mixed in different combinations to create all other colors.

Thank you for the information, but I am afraid I did not communicate properly. If you notice, you described everything about green except for what green looks like. You can describe objective facts about green and make comparisons, but is there a way to communicate what green is like to someone? Does green look the same to all creatures with eyes? It would be nice to have a scientific way to infiltrate the subjective and communicate it effectively, but so far there is no way. Trying to explain green to you would be just like if I were to invent a color that doesn't exist and then try to explain what that looks like.
Actually, I can just use ultra violet light as an example. What would it look like to see ultra violet light? What COLOR is ultra violet light? Using instruments only converts it to a color we can already see.

 

[SMOGZINN]

Thank you for the information, but I am afraid I did not communicate properly.

I think you did, I think you just have not yet understood my argument.

If you notice, you described everything about green except for what green looks like. You can describe objective facts about green and make comparisons, but is there a way to communicate what green is like to someone?

I described exactly what green looks like. It look like light with a predominant wavelength of roughly 495–570 nm.

Does green look the same to all creatures with eyes?

Yes, because light with a predominant wavelength of roughly 495–570 nm is a real thing. If you call light with a predominant wavelength of roughly 495–570 nm something other then green you are labeling it wrong and we then say you have colorblindness.

Trying to explain green to you would be just like if I were to invent a color that doesn't exist and then try to explain what that looks like.

There are plenty of colors of light we can not see with our eyes. We never the less have ways to describe those colors.

What would it look like to see ultra violet light? What COLOR is ultra violet light? Using instruments only converts it to a color we can already see.

That is it, there is nothing more to it. It is light at specific wave lengths, the rest is all interpretation of that data. Your interpretation is as good as my interpretation is as good as a machines interpretation. They are all just analysis of information, not information itself.

 

[moonbogg]

@ smogzinn

I like that way of putting it. Green is what it is. Its simple that way and its also true. I just can't help but stay stuck on the subjective part of it. How does that processing take place in conjunction with experience? The biomechanical processes of the brain are the experience themselves? Is brain processing equal to experience? They are one and the same? It would seem that is your view on it, similar to Dan Dennett equating consciousness to a "bag of tricks". He sweeps it under the rug as if there is nothing to figure out. I suspect that there is something not being said here about subjective experience.

 

[SMOGZINN]

@ smogzinn

I like that way of putting it. Green is what it is. Its simple that way and its also true. I just can't help but stay stuck on the subjective part of it. How does that processing take place in conjunction with experience? The biomechanical processes of the brain are the experience themselves? Is brain processing equal to experience? They are one and the same? It would seem that is your view on it, similar to Dan Dennett equating consciousness to a "bag of tricks". He sweeps it under the rug as if there is nothing to figure out. I suspect that there is something not being said here about subjective experience.

At this point we have to take a step to the right and ask, do you believe in the spiritual? If the answer is yes then you can say that there is some sort of 'soul' that does the experiencing of those biochemical reactions. If, like me, you answer no there is no spiritual, then your quest ends at those biochemical processes.