Mackay's account of inexplicable mania was unchallenged, and mostly unexamined, until the 1980s.
[43] Research into tulip mania since then, especially by proponents of the
efficient-market hypothesis,
[17] suggests that his story was incomplete and inaccurate. In her 2007 scholarly analysis
Tulipmania, Anne Goldgar states that the phenomenon was limited to "a fairly small group", and that most accounts from the period "are based on one or two contemporary pieces of
propaganda and a prodigious amount of
plagiarism".
[11] Peter Garber argues that the trade in common bulbs "was no more than a meaningless winter drinking game, played by a plague-ridden population that made use of the vibrant tulip market."
[44]
While Mackay's account held that a wide array of society was involved in the tulip trade, Goldgar's study of archived contracts found that even at its peak the trade in tulips was conducted almost exclusively by merchants and skilled craftsmen who were wealthy, but not members of the nobility.
[45] Any economic fallout from the bubble was very limited. Goldgar, who identified many prominent buyers and sellers in the market, found fewer than half a dozen who experienced financial troubles in the time period, and even of these cases it is not clear that tulips were to blame.
[46] This is not altogether surprising. Although prices had risen, money had not changed hands between buyers and sellers. Thus profits were never
realized for sellers; unless sellers had made other purchases on credit in expectation of the profits, the collapse in prices did not cause anyone to lose money.
[47]